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ABSTRACT 
 
The European Union introduced the concept of global reforms in the 1990s, in 
order to open markets for competition. The trajectory of reforms in South 
Africa took the following shape: first, liberalisation of markets in the 
telecommunications industry. Second, were the privatisation of incumbents, 
and lastly, the creation of regulatory agencies, which were mandated by the 
American Telecommunications Act of 1996 (No. 103 of 1996) to promote 
competition. These changes opened the market for the licensing of cellular 
network operators, to compete with the dominant fixed line provider on voice 
and data services. Competition in its nature, aims to improve services, 
provide affordable prices to consumers and flexible products where consumer 
can exercise choice. One of the highlights of competition in the 
telecommunications sector came through the legislative requirement for the 
industry to introduce number portability. There are different types of number 
portability but for purposes of this study, focus shall be on mobile number 
portability (MNP).  
This study examines the extent to which MNP has benefited consumers who 
have ported their number in South Africa. The first chapter provides a 
background on the global reforms in the telecommunication sector, and this is 
followed by reforms in South Africa. The second chapter provides a literature 
review on the effects of MNP, and looks at the regulatory framework of MNP, 
processes of porting, and the results of the introduction of MNP in various 
countries.  
The study found that policy and regulations on MNP had both positive and 
negative effects. Consumers are now able to switch operators whilst keeping 
their numbers, thus exercising their right to choice.  However, prices still 
remain uncompetitive and quality of service is yet to improve.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Consumer  
“A consumer in South Africa is defined as a person who has entered into a 
transaction with a supply in the ordinary course of the supplier’s business” 
(Consumer Protection Act, 2008, p.18).  For the purposes of this study, 
consumers are those who have subscribed with Mobile Operators in order to 
acquire mobile services. Consumers for mobile services consist of post-paid 
and pre-paid subscribers. 
Customer Education 
When MNP was introduced, many countries conducted ex ante and ex post 
assessment. The purpose was to investigate if consumers received 
information about MNP and to further determine if they were ready to 
embrace it.  Customer Education was part of the regulatory requirement for 
operators and regulators. In South Korea, the research results on the ex post 
study indicated that consumer education played a pivotal role in the resolve 
by consumers to port their numbers, and as a result, the rate of porting 
numbers grew (Lyons, 2006).  
Donor Operator 
A Donor Operator refers to a network operator which ceases to serve a 
number that is being ported (Government Gazette, no 28091, p.5). For 
instance, if a subscriber of MTN ports his or her number to Cell C, then MTN 
becomes a Donor Operator. According to the regulations, the Donor 
Operator, should not within three months of porting, “winback” the customer 
who has switched to another operator.  
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Ex-Ante  
A term that refers to future events, such as future returns or prospects of a 
company. Using ex-ante analysis helps to give an idea of future movements 
in price or the future impact of a newly implemented policy 
(http//www.investpedia.com) and Ex-post translated from Latin means "after 
the fact"(http://wiki.answers.com). 
Mobile Number Portability 
Mobile number portability is the ability to take your existing mobile number to 
a new service with a new provider. Mobile number portability is not a service 
feature or a product; it is the removal of a barrier to choosing the provider or 
service that suits you (http://www.acma.gov.za) 
On-net  
An on-net call refers to calls a customer of a network operator to a customer 
belonging to the same network (Podvysotskiy, 2006). For example, when a 
consumer of Vodacom (082) who has not ported their number calls Vodacom 
number, calls become cheaper as they both use the same network.  
Off-net  
An off-net call is made by a customer of a network to customers belonging to 
another competing network (Podvysotskiy, 2006). For example, when a 
consumer of Vodacom (082) calls MTN number (083) which is not ported, 
then prices for calls are a bit higher because they are using different 
networks. However, if numbers have been ported, then the caller will be 
notified by a beep, to indicate that the numbers called have been ported. 
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Ordering System Specification (OSS) 
 
Ordering System Specification means a specification of the procedures by 
which a recipient Service Provider, a recipient operator, and a donor Service 
Provider exchange information between each other in order to provide 
number portability to a Subscriber, including the information to be sent, the 
format of the information, the means of communication, the times when 
communication may be sent, the time limits for responses and the handling of 
error conditions (Government Gazette, no 28091).  
Pre-paid 
In the mobile phone industry, prepaid refers to a type of mobile phone 
account that requires its owner to purchase call credit before services can be 
used (http://www.mobileburn.com). 
Price 
The consideration for any transaction, means the total paid or payable by the 
consumer to the supplier in terms of that transaction or agreement, including 
any amount that supplier is required to impose, charge or collect in terms of 
any public regulations (Consumer Protection Act, 2008:24).  
Post-paid 
Post-paid customers are those that are billed for their use of a carrier's 
services on a monthly basis, based on either the terms of a contract or on the 
amount of the services they have used. (http://www.mobileburn.com). 
Recipient Operator 
A Recipient Operator is a Service Provider that is starting to serve a number 
is being ported (Government Gazette, no 28091, p.5). For instance, if Cell C 
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receives a request from a subscriber of MTN for porting, then Cell C becomes 
a Recipient Operator. 
Switching costs 
They are described as costs that customers have to bear when they switch 
from one service provider to the other (Podvysotskiy, 2006). 
Subscriber 
This refers to any person or entity which is a party to a contract or other 
similar arrangement that is in force with a service provider or network 
operator for the supply of telecommunication services (Government Gazette 
no. 26834, 2004).  
Termination costs 
Termination costs are the costs that are incurred by callers to mobile numbers 
including ported numbers. A study conducted in Europe on MNP indicates 
that consumer’s ignorance on costs for on net and off-net termination calls 
could result in increase in price, whilst their understanding of the differences 
could reduce prices (Buehler, 2005).  
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND ON MOBILE NUMBERPORTABILITY (MNP) 
AND COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
  
1. Introduction  
The concept of mobile number portability is good for consumers. Porting 
creates competition in the telecommunication industry. Importantly, has it 
proved successful? This chapter provides an overview on the introduction of 
Mobile Number Portability (MNP) and reasons for this subject, as a choice of 
study. It begins with the definition of MNP, types of MNP and the evolution of 
telecommunications reforms which led to the introduction of MNP. MNP 
cannot be studied in isolation; there is a need to unpack global and South 
African reforms, which led to competition and subsequently the introduction of 
MNP. Furthermore, there will be an analysis of policies and regulations 
published in order to prepare for MNP and how this unfolded in terms of 
consumer benefits both internationally and in South Africa (SA).  
MNP is described as the ability of customers to switch operators whilst 
retaining their mobile service number. MNP entails porting processes, code of 
conduct between Donor Operator and Recipient Operator, technology used 
for porting, competition, and customer standards to determine the success or 
failure of MNP depending on how they are implemented by mobile operators 
(ICASA, 2005).  
‘In MNP terminology, the operator which loses a customer is known as the 
Donor Operator while the one receiving a ported number is referred to as the 
Recipient Operator. As an illustration, before the introduction of MNP, all 
numbers prefixed with 082 were routed to Vodacom, 083 to MTN and 084 to 
Cell C, Vodacom, MTN and Cell C are the three mobile network licensees in 
South Africa.  With the implementation of MNP, 082 numbers for example, 
can now be ported to any network’ (Goldstuck, 2005, p.14). 
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There are various types of number portability: provider portability where a 
customer retains their number while moving to a similar service but offered by 
a different provider; service portability allows a customer to move their service 
number between different service types; and lastly location portability, which 
enables a customer to move the geographic location of their service while 
retaining their numbers. For purposes of this study, the focus will be on 
provider portability, which may be fixed or mobile number portability. In South 
Africa, the challenge in dealing simultaneously with both categories was that 
the second fixed line network operator was not yet licensed at the time of 
introduction of MNP (Hibbard, De Ridder & Clarke, 2008). 
MNP involves three factors:  technical, operational and economical. 
Technically, MNP requires additional mechanisms which enable numbers to 
be routed accordingly. Operationally, the process includes processes taking 
place between operators as well as customers. Economically, MNP is said to 
benefit consumers and the industry increases competition (Bernadi & Nuitjen, 
2000). 
1.1. Benefits of MNP 
 
The Australian Commission Authority (ACC) regards MNP as a key regulatory 
driver of competition. It increases competition, both at the wholesale and 
retail levels; provides consumers with a greater choice of network providers; it 
lowers the cost of switching from one operator to another operator; and 
encourages efficient investment in the network infrastructure by offering 
incentives to new and existing market respondents in order to offer innovative 
services to consumers in order to respectively attract or retain existing 
customers (Australian Commission Authority, 1998). 
For purposes of this study, focus is given to consumer benefits. However it is 
important to highlight the value chain of benefits across the whole spectrum 
of stakeholders, as outlined in the study by Syniverse Technologies (2007) 
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since data will be collected from mobile operators and the regulator as part of 
the study.  The benefits are categorised as follows: consumer benefits, 
market benefits, and regulatory benefits and operator benefits. First, for 
consumers, it eliminates among others the inconvenience of having to 
change the phone numbers, update address books, change programmed 
contact list and remember new numbers. For business, it avoids more 
expenses with regard to changing stationery, business cards, print adverting, 
websites updates, signage and invoices. Second, for the market; the 
introduction of free market forces operators to focus more on subscribers. In 
this instance, price is not a determining factor for attracting and retaining 
customers but operators introduce consumer loyalty programmes, improve 
customers service, reduce hold times, increase outbound calling 
programmes, focus on renewal incentive, work to improve network coverage 
and provide value added service such as Wi-Fi, push-to-talk service and 3G. 
Third, for the regulatory environment, it allows for synergy between operators 
and regulators where the central database used for porting processes by 
operators is used by numbering plan administrators to assign numbers in a 
more efficient way. Fourth, for operators, it is used to gain market share and 
others target business and average revenue per user per month (ARPU) 
subscribers (Syniverse Technologies, 2007).  
1.2. Challenges with regard to the implementation of MNP 
 
The implementation of MNP globally was expected to spur competition in the 
mobile market. Other factors which would determine competition included  
decrease in mobile tariffs and increase in the mobile related usage, 
improvement in customer service and satisfaction, differentiation in innovation 
in mobile packages and value added services, introduction of new technology 
and ease of market entry for new respondents (Chak, 2007, p. 23).  
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The Infocom Development Authority of Singapore (IDA) reviewed the costs 
for MNP switching. They found that recurring monthly charges for porting 
incurred by consumers was a hindrance for those wishing to port. Moreover 
such costs impacted negatively on the welfare of consumers and competition 
in the market. IDA subsequently instructed all operators to cease monthly 
recurring charges but were allowed to charge a once off amount. This 
decision was regarded as a potential boost for consumer benefit and also a 
tool for competition growth. It was further established that porting was only 
limited to post-paid but that decision was cancelled to include pre-paid as 
well, thus increasing porting (IDA, 2003). 
The National Economic Research Associates (NERA) conducted a study 
which was used as a benchmark for most of academic research on the impact 
of MNP.  Experiences differed according to countries. On the negative side, 
porting in Germany took 31 days to be completed. In Italy, only 3, 68% of 
subscribers ported their numbers a year after MNP was introduced in a 
country of 95% subscriber base of mobile telephony. In the US, there was a 
delay with regard to the introduction of MNP because of resistance by mobile 
operators to launch. Hong Kong reported positive effects on MNP as 
operators embraced the MNP facility and porting processes were effectively 
implemented (NERA, 1998). 
A Synovate survey on MNP was conducted prior to the implementation of 
MNP in South Africa. The purpose was to determine the level of awareness 
on MNP and further to establish if it would have a positive impact. 
Interviewees were segmented according to age, gender and level of income 
in this case, high earners.  During the ex-ante assessment which is described 
as a study that takes place before the fact respondents indicated their 
willingness to port their numbers after the implementation of MNP. The study 
further dealt with both advantages and disadvantages of MNP. The 
disadvantages include networking locking where operators lock the SIM card 
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to avoid easy access to other operator’s network, network prefix identification, 
which is described as the first three numbers such as (082, 083 or 084) and 
implementation costs which are costs incurred by operators but passed on to 
consumers. Three advantages were expected to be in place for consumers: 
choice, lower prices and better services (Goldstuck & Ambrose, 2006). 
1.3. Global reforms which sought to introduce competition in the 
telecommunications sector 
This section explains attributes of global reforms in the telecommunications 
sector including countries which were impacted. The evolution entails 
liberalisation, privatisation, regulation, and competition which led to the 
introduction of MNP and the resultant consumer benefits. These components 
will inform the choice of academic literature on the effects of MNP to 
consumer and will be discussed in detail in the literature review.  
The effects of industrialisation on demand and supply also impacted on the 
telecom industry and ICT companies identified infrastructure gaps in 
developing countries and opportunities for investment. On the one hand, 
developing countries required world-class technology to compete globally and 
direct investment was inevitable. The bone of contention though was state 
ownership of country incumbents (Melody, 2007).  
According to the World Trade Organisations (WTO) supported by IMF and 
World Bank, the telecommunications sector was required to privatise its state 
enterprises and introduce competition in order to lower costs for consumers 
(WTO, 2002). A study by Castells (2000) has shown that globalisation cannot 
take place in isolation and can be facilitated through Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICTs). For growth and development to take 
place, connectivity to networks is vital. In essence, ICT is the enabler of 
globalisation and importantly one of the drivers of globalisation is investment. 
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However, liberalisation and privatisation had to be introduced in order for 
investment to take place in a viable economic environment (Castells, 2000).   
1.3.1. Liberalisation of telecommunications markets 
 
The concept of liberalisation of the telecommunication market was first 
introduced in EU countries. In some countries such as France it was met by 
resistance from labour unions. About twenty (20) countries within the 
Organisation for Economic and Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
deliberated on processes which member countries had to develop in order to 
prepare for the introduction of the telecommunication reforms. Historically, the 
fixed line telecommunications network operators were monopolies solely 
owned by governments both developing and developed countries. However, 
challenges in respect to the ever evolving technology, high costs of 
maintaining infrastructure, and the need for quality of service, compelled 
governments to consider introducing policy reforms. 
Liberalisation is described as a process of opening up a previously restricted 
economy and or market to competition from local or international entities 
(Murdock, 1990). The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
defines liberalisation in terms of access for service suppliers and focuses on 
competition, with foreign participation beginning with an environment 
conducive to market entry primarily for the other members of WTO (WTO, 
1997).  
Ospina (2002) posits the effects of telecommunications liberalisation on two 
main determinants of access, namely, availability and affordability. He 
highlights challenges of availability of with regard to fixed telephones and how 
the introduction of mobile services reduced the backlog of voice telephony 
(ITU, 1998). In his argument his assertion is that affordability looks at the 
price factor with respect to telephone services. Ospina cites a study 
conducted by Milne (2000, p. 9-10) which indicates that when the cost of 
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telephone services exceeds three percent average income, it is no longer 
affordable for the majority of the population. Essentially, he argues that 
liberalisation may impact positively or negatively on consumers depending on 
how it is implemented (Ospina, 2002). 
In a liberalised market, established operators are keen to focus on customers, 
improve services, accelerate network expansion, and reduce costs and lower 
prices (Petrazzini & Clark, 1996). However, another argument posited is that 
state owned enterprises alone cannot provide efficient and cost effective 
services (ITU, 2003). 
 Frempong & Artuba (2001) argue: 
Liberalisation of a telecommunications market should according to its 
proponents, provide consumers with increased, more advanced, 
modern and affordable services. It should impact positively on the 
development of the sector, especially in the developing countries 
charecterised by a non-performing public monopoly (p.198)  
1.3.2. Privatisation of telecommunication markets 
Liberalisation of the telecommunications sector led to the privatisation of state 
enterprises. During this period, state assets were sold to private companies. 
Gillwald (2003) views privatisation as the funding model proposed by 
international financing agencies in the 90s in order to attract investment as a 
result of poor state of infrastructure and minimal customer base in developing 
countries (Gillwald, 2003).  
 
1See “The UK experience”. Conference paper presented in Singapore, Singapore (1990) as quoted in 
“Who benefitted from Privatization? (Routledge, 1998 quoted by Orsono, 2007). 
                                                           
1
  
 T. Dube. Student Number: 296539  24 
 
There is evidence across the world of benefits of privatisation and they 
include improved performance, increased output and quality performance 
(Chong, 2003).  Ramamurti (1996) indicates that the privatisation in the 
telecommunication sector resulted to rapid expansion of networks. The 
reforms led to the introduction of US Telecommunications Act of 1996. This 
legislation was used to liberalise the telecom markets. It was further used to 
force operators of mobile and fixed line telephony to develop processes which 
will ensure that number portability becomes available for consumers. 
Countries such as the United Kingdom, United States, Germany and Canada, 
complied with the OECD requirements and implemented such reforms 
(OECD, 2004).  
The implementation of these reforms required member countries to develop 
regulations which contain among others, consumer provisions vis-a-vis 
number portability, quality of service and universal service (InfoDev, 2006, p. 
16).  
 Martin, Roma & Vansteenkiste (2005) cited the OECD’s definition of reforms: 
Regulatory reform refers to changes that improve the regulatory 
quality, that is, enhance the performance, cost effectiveness or legal 
quality of regulations and related government formalities. Reform can 
mean the revision of a single regulation, the scrapping and rebuilding 
of an entire regulatory regime and its institution, or improvement of 
processes making regulations and managing reform (p.6).  
In 2007, the governments of The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS) also developed a project called Economic Diversification Project, 
which in the main, was aimed at the promotion of competition in the 
telecommunications sector. Like the OECD countries, they viewed 
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telecommunications as a vital part of the economy. This project highlighted 
three pertinent areas of concern which were high costs of telecommunication 
services, lack of trained personnel in the sector and lack of infrastructure. 
Moreover, the project dealt with challenges which were faced by new entrants 
who could not make strides in the industry due to an uneven playing field, and 
exponential growth of charges by monopolistic incumbents. The OECS 
project led to the introduction of the mobile market in 2003 (OECS, 2007).  
 
1.3.3.   Regulation and Competition 
There are benefits associated with liberalisation and include provision of 
increased, advanced and affordable services (Frempong & Artuba, 2001, 
p.198). However, for these benefits to be realised, there is need for a creation 
of a strong independent regulator, in order to ensure a balancing of consumer 
protection and operators interests.  
The role and function of regulatory bodies needs to be clearly defined, and it 
is to operate transparently and effectively in the interest of the public. 
Regulatory bodies at the time of their formation were often compelled to 
address the challenges of markets which were not competitive. “In a 
liberalised telecom industry, both competition policy and consumer protection 
policy take on much greater significance” (Melody, 2003, p.4).  
Melody (2003) describes competition as the driver of low costs, quality of 
service and customer attraction. Melody alludes to the idea that the market is 
effective and competitive when at least five or six players are competing 
rivals, with no significant barrier to entry and with no single firm exercising its 
dominance (Melody, 2003, p. 27).  
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Wallsten (1999) quoted by Gardener (2003) on competition: 
Competition or even simply a credible threat of competition will spur 
established telecommunications operators to focus attention on 
customers, improve services, accelerate network expansion, and 
reduce costs and lower prices (p.43) 
Similarly, Murdock (1990) illustrates three phases which should be looked at 
for reforms: market liberalisation, market regulation and privatisation of 
previous incumbent.  He views liberalisation as the process of opening up a 
previously restricted economy and or market to competition from local or 
international entities (Murdock, 1990).  
In order to ensure the implementation and success of the telecommunications 
reforms, another element of global reforms was introduced. This occurred 
through the formation of regulatory agencies. The regulatory agencies were 
created to be independent and to regulate in the public interest. .The 
mandate of these independent institutions is to ensure fair and just 
development and promulgation of regulations, using policy directives as a 
frame of reference. Moreover, their function is to monitor and enforce 
compliance by market players (Gupta, George, Bajaj, Shenoi & Jindal; 2001). 
Prior to the introduction of number portability, numbers for fixed line operators 
were allocated according to geographic area, and as mentioned in the 
introduction, for mobile service providers the differentiation was based on the 
first three digits. However, with the introduction of Number Portability, this 
identification would change (InfoDev, 2006, p. 23).  
Various countries started with the process of developing consultation 
documents and issued public notices for stakeholder participation in order to 
develop MNP regulations.  
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Figure 1: The following graph represents countries which have 
introduced MNP:  
 
Source: Telecommunications Management Group, 2009. 
Singapore  
According to the Infocomm Development Authority (IDA), (2003), MNP was 
firstly introduced in Singapore in 1996. In line with the regulations, customers 
were expected to pay monthly fees to their previous service provider. Upon 
review, the regulator found that the recurring monthly charges for porting 
incurred by consumers were a hindrance for those wishing to port. Moreover 
such costs impacted negatively on the welfare of consumers and competition 
in the market. IDA subsequently instructed all operators to cease monthly 
recurring charges, and were allowed to charge a once off amount. This 
decision was regarded as a potential boost for consumer benefit and also a 
tool for competition growth. It was further established that porting was only 
limited to post-paid but that decision was reversed to include pre-paid 
subscribers as well. This increased porting numbers (IDA, 2003). 
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United Kingdom (UK)   
UK had four mobile operators namely: Cellnet, Vodafone, Orange and 
One2one. The office Telecommunication (OFTEL) which is now Office of 
Communications (OFCOM) is the regulator of telecommunications in the UK. 
It conducted a feasibility study to determine the readiness of the country in 
respect to the introduction of MNP. The findings concluded that the country 
was ready for the implementation of MNP. In order to prepare for the 
introduction of MNP, the following had to be complied with: mobile operators 
were expected to put operational systems in place, mobile operators were 
further obligated to educate consumers about MNP and the technology  used 
for porting had to comply with the functional specification as agreed upon by 
operators. A study by Ovum indicated that the net benefit for UK would at 
least grow to 98 million pounds over the first ten years period of MNP (ACA, 
1988). 
There are two types of ports which take place in the UK: consumer ports and 
Bulk ports. Consumer ports involve porting by individuals from one service 
provider to the other, and bulk porting involves business. In the UK, the 
porting process is Donor led, where a consumer wishing to port informs the 
Donor service provider in order to get the Port Authorization Code (PAC). 
This process is different to other European countries where consumer port is 
Recipient service provider led. With regard to the recipient led process, the 
service provider submits the port request on behalf of the consumer 
(OFCOM, 2009). 
An ex-post study in the UK was commissioned by OFCOM in order to identify 
and analyse the porting processes which were not working well for 
consumers. OFCOM (2009) found out that there were difficulties experienced 
by a few consumers who wanted to port and they included: 
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• unwanted or excessive save activity imposed on consumers by 
the donor network at the point of PAC request. Several 
respondents commented on the “hard sell” approach adopted by 
operators when they made the PAC request. Respondents 
described experiences of having to go through “negotiation 
battles” with the operator in order to get them to release the 
PAC. One shopper noted: “I felt I was being put under 
increasing and unacceptable pressure to continue my contract”. 
• refusal or failure to issue PACs to consumers, despite receipt of 
a valid request. This led to most consumers indicating a 
preference for recipient led process. 
• delays that extended the length of the end-to-end porting 
process; in particular in MNOs issuing PACs to consumers, 
• Consumers also indicated that the two day porting time frame 
was long (Ofcom, 2009, p: 7). 
OFCOM continued with the consultative process to order to finalise the review 
process with the intention to make recommendations favourable to 
consumers. 
 Hong Kong 
MNP was implemented in Hong Kong in 1999 as mandated by The Office of 
the Telecommunication Regulator (OFTA). This was done after much 
resistance by big operators. Seemingly, MNP was well received by 
consumers because during its first month, more than 102,000 applications 
were made for switching (ACA, 1999).  At the start, OFTA commissioned a 
feasibility study which was conducted by NERA in respect to the cost- benefit 
analysis of MNP. The objectives of the study were firstly to identify the 
technical options for the implementation of MNP on all mobile networks. 
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Secondly assess the costs, availability and risks of each technical options, 
and finally looked at demand for, estimates of MNP options to recover the 
costs of portability (Telecommunications Authority, 1998).  
The research results indicated that MNP would promote fair competition and 
increase a net profit.  In the study, three types of consumer benefits were 
captured and are: quality of service, lower prices and consumer choice. 
Details of these benefits will be discussed in the literature review, as analysed 
by various scholars.  
The developments with regard to the introduction of MNP in Hong Kong came 
at the time when the market was very competitive with four fixed line 
operators and seven mobile operators. In the consultation paper on MNP, 
OFTA stated that: “With such a fast growing mobile customer base in Hong 
Kong and the choice of mobile networks available to customers, the OFTA 
believes that there would be some genuine demands and requirements from 
customers for mobile number portability”. In terms of the economic recovery, 
the country was going to benefit by 461 million Hong Kong Dollar (HKD) 
(NERA, 1998, p. 8). 
As stated before, the existence and the success of MNP depended on the 
technical feasibility. Hong Kong adopted the call forwarding facility which was 
a common technology in many countries. Caller Line Identification (CLI) was 
also introduced. Short Message Service (SMS) was seen as a value added 
service over voice telephony, however, it could not be included as part of 
services. This limitation could pose challenges to consumers in need of this 
service. Another technical challenge was the international calls on ported 
numbers, which could not be traced by the recipient operator at least during 
the early stages of porting (NERA, 1998). 
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Sweden  
Sweden was the first Nordic country to implement MNP. At the time, there 
were 16 mobile operators. According to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
as amended, number portability was supposed to be implemented in 1999, 
but was delayed and finally introduced in 2001. The Act further stipulated that 
any costs incurred during the implementation of MNP within the operators 
would be borne by them (operators) and costs related to the transfer of the 
subscriber could be charged to the recipient operator by the donor operator 
(Levin, 2006).  
Despite the introduction of MNP, consumers were not motivated to port. 
Instead, it is reported that there was a high percentage of churn rate (Gupta 
et al, 2001). Churn rate occurs when subscribers change network operators 
without fear of losing their numbers.  
Mokadikwa (2008) cites (Majuba, n.d) and provides types of churn: 
There are two type of churn: Voluntary – the customer stops using the 
service due to one or other reasons, such as pricing, poor network 
quality or inadequate customer service to name a few. Involuntary – 
the service provider bars the customer from utilizing the service for no-
payment or another reason (p.3).  
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Australia 
This graph represents porting in Australia, where MNP was well embraced by 
consumers. 
Figure 2: Annual Volume of mobile number ports, Australia 
  
Source: Australian Communications and Media Authority, 1999 
A study was conducted in Australia on the telecommunications market. It was 
established that prices were fairly competitive. Further, there was a high 
churn rate in the market for mobile services which would increase the level of 
porting should MNP be introduced. The Minister of Communications and 
Technology in Australia made a pronouncement that the costs of changing 
numbers outweighed the benefits for consumers, and therefore it was 
imperative that the Australian regulator introduces MNP (ACA, 1999). 
In 2001, mobile operators in Australia implemented MNP through the 
Australian Communication Authority (ACA) directives and are seen as the 
world leader in implementing MNP.  
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In 2007, Network Strategies wrote an article about the successes of MNP in 
Australia citing a study conducted by ACA in 2007. The report indicated that 
over five million successful ports took place with an average of 85,000 ports 
per month. The success was attributed to consumers’ experience on MNP: 
“Why is MNP a success in Australia? Quite simply, from the consumer’s 
viewpoint it is a quick, seamless, low-cost experience” (Network strategies, 
2007, p.1). 
Like in the UK, the regulator remained technology neutral and allowed mobile 
operators to determine the type of technology suitable for MNP. It was 
estimated that the introduction of MNP would contribute to the economy of 
the country by 160 million Australian dollars (Gupta et al., 2001). 
ACA commissioned an investigation emanating from consumer complaints 
and anti-competitive behavior by some of the operators. With regard to 
consumer complaints, porting which was supposed to take hours took days 
and this was frustrating to consumers. The findings indicated that MNP 
implementation was challenging during its first week due to outages. Basically 
the problems were regarded as teething problems which could be resolved in 
the process. Furthermore, it was reported that most porting took place within 
the stipulated time and about 5000 consumers had ported during first week of 
its introduction. ACA, concluded that consumers were not receiving quality 
service and that furthermore, the problem was exacerbated by lack of 
information (ACA, 2001). 
Italy 
MNP was launched in Italy in 2001. According to Levin (2006) two years after 
the introduction of MNP, only 3, and 68% of consumers had ported their 
number. The percentage was higher than those of their European countries 
such as Portugal, Spain and Germany.  According to the study, MNP did not 
make any impact despite 95% mobile usage, of which 93% are prepaid. 
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Porting took 5 working days to complete in a market of 3 mobile operators 
(Levin: 2006).  
Ireland 
According to the consultation paper developed by Ovum for the Office of the 
Director Telecommunication Regulation (2001: 7-9), discussions initially 
began on the Numbering Plan and subsequently MNP was implemented. 
Ovum conducted a study regarding the MNP implementation processes and 
made the following recommendations: first, the process of porting should not 
be dependent on the retail sales process. Essentially, a customer wishing to 
port was required to first open a new account as per procedure, including the 
allocation of a new number from a number block of the new operator. 
Thereafter, they had to make a request to the new operator to have the old 
number ported and the new number withdrawn, without any involvement of 
the retailers. According to Ovum, this two-stage process has positive effects  
to consumers because it avoid the costs, complexities and delays that result 
from involving the retailer in the process. Second, the right to port a number 
should be established primarily by checking that the user has possession of 
an existing mobile phone which uses that number (Ovum, 2000). 
According to the report by the Office of Director of Telecommunications 
(2007), Ovum proposed that validation be made with regard to the 
compatibility of the customer’s current handset, in relation to the number 
intended for porting. They proposed that such validation could be achieved in 
a number of ways: 
• a call from the mobile, where the CLI shows the number to be 
ported; 
• a call to the number to be ported, establishing that the user has 
possession of a mobile using the number; 
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• a recent bill showing the number to be ported. 
Lastly, the donor operator should accept a number portability order from the 
recipient operator for the purposes of both porting the number and closing the 
account with the customer. This study further indicates that this requirement 
is essential to ensure that the porting process takes place speedily and 
reliably.  
The donor operator should not refuse porting on the grounds of: 
• the customer having an outstanding debt; 
• the customer not having completed the minimum 
contract period; 
• the customer’s handset being Subscriber Identity 
Module (SIM) locked so that it can only work on the 
donor operator’s network (p. 7-9).   
Germany 
In 2002, the German telecommunication regulator, the ‘Bundesnetzagentur’ 
commissioned a study in order to assess the readiness of the country for 
MNP. The objective was to look at competition and consumer benefits. Like 
other countries, the operators were required to establish a central database 
system which will administer all porting activities.  
Porting in Germany took 31 days. Consumers were required to terminate their 
contract with the existing service provider before joining a new one. 
Consumers who wished to port their numbers were requested to pay fees to 
the donor operator.  Porting at the time was low due to the fact that it was not 
mandatory for mobile operators to conduct awareness programmes. Another 
contributory factor for low porting was because consumers had to wait for a 
period of two years before porting.  
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Finland 
In Finland, MNP was implemented in 2003. According to the Communications 
Market Act, “a telecommunications operator shall not charge a user for the 
transfer of a telephone number to another telecommunications operator.” This 
was in contrast to countries such as Germany, which charged fees porting. 
The donor operator may, however, receive a one-off payment equivalent to 
the one-off costs of transferring the telephone number. Over 1000 000 ported 
numbers were reported during its first year (Smura, 2004).  
United States 
The Telecommunication Act of 1996 in the United States (US) gave a 
directive for competition to be introduced.  At the start, the regulatory directive 
was met by resistance from mobile operators who indicated that the market 
was already competitive with six mobile operators. However, they were 
obliged to comply with the regulations. Further obstacles to introducing MNP 
were exacerbated by lengthy postponements resulting from technological 
challenges, but MNP was finally implemented in June 2003. FCC conducted 
a study to examine how the introduction of MNP could affect the market price, 
consumer welfare and market concentration. The research results will be 
discussed in the literature review (NERA, 1998).  
A quantitative study was conducted in the US about the effects of mobile 
number portability and it focused on consumer perception and behaviors. In 
terms of the sample size, 684 mobile subscribers were interviewed. Data was 
collected from the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association from 
2003 to 2005. A telephone survey was done with 422 subscribers and survey 
questionnaires were attached to 138 subscribers’ emails (NERA, 1998). 
The questionnaires asked respondents about reasons for porting, quality of 
service, customer satisfaction, switching costs, lock-in and prices. The 
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research results were that the then implementation of MNP did not satisfy the 
regulator’s intention to reduce switching barriers and that subscribers have 
been locked in. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
recommended that future work had to determine if the implementation of MNP 
was done in an effective way (NERA, 1998). 
1.4. Reforms in South Africa which sought to bring competition in the 
telecommunications sector 
1.4.1. Liberalisation of the telecommunications sector 
As it happened in the developed countries, South Africa had to follow global 
trends on liberalisation. According to Horwitz (2001) telecommunications 
reforms in South Africa took place at the time when the country was moving 
towards a new dispensation after many years of apartheid government. 
Policies were biased towards the minority of white Africans, with the majority 
of the population lacking services (Horwitz, 2001).   
As mentioned by Ley Federal de Telecommunications (1995) quoted by 
Osorno (2007): “The opportune opening to competition in telecommunications 
services will contribute to the economic development…the opening of 
telecommunications sector will directly and indirectly bring benefits” (Osorno, 
2007, p. 149). 
Horwitz (2001) conducted another study regarding the telecommunications 
reforms in South Africa. He reports that in 1994, the African National 
Congress (ANC) led government, initiated the Reconstruction and 
Development programme (RDP). During this time, the Telecommunication 
Forum was also established. The forum was established to develop 
discussions papers on the status of telecommunication services in South 
Africa. The main concerns raised in the discussion paper were about 
communications services, where affordable services were identified and 
targeted as a basic need (Horwitz, 2001).   
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A study by Ayogu and Hodge (2001), explored the contents of the white and 
green papers as it was done by Horwitz. The White Paper contained  the 
following prescriptions: the provision of universal and affordable 
telecommunications services, encouraged ownership and control of 
telecommunications services by persons from previously disadvantaged 
communities, encourage investment and innovation in the telecommunication 
industry, encourage the development of competition in the 
telecommunications manufacturing and supply sectors and ensure fair 
competition within the telecommunication sector (Ayogu & Hodge, 2001, p. 
14).  
Telkom was the monopoly incumbent providing fixed line services. With 
liberalisation government supported the introduction of the cellular operators 
and the licensing of the second network operator. There was a belief that 
competition would benefit, though the efforts to establish effective competition 
were slow. As indicated by Gardner (2003) unions in the WTO member 
countries were opposed to the concept of liberalisation of the market as they 
viewed competition to be beneficial to the high end and not the lower end.   
Cosatu (2003) as cited by Gardner (2003) argued: 
 While we are not opposed to some regulated competition of the 
provision of high level services to business, we are opposed to 
competition in the provision of basic telephony. Given the massive 
needs for extension of telephone services… we believe that optimum 
market structure would be for Telkom to have sole responsibility for the 
roll out of basic telephony, with this responsibility being funded both 
from the fiscus and dedicated levies on operators (p. 87).   
According to White (2004) the first approach to reforms was through the 
introduction and public consultation on a green and a white paper, aiming at 
assisting government to formulate a new policy. In 1996, government 
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published an edition of the Government Gazette which among other things 
addressed the establishment of an independent regulator.  During the same 
year, the Telecommunication Act 1996 was promulgated (White, 2004).  
The key aspects contained in the Act were to establish the regulator for the 
telecommunication sector, namely: the South African Regulatory Authority 
(SATRA). This was followed by the formation of the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA). SATRA was accountable to the Minister of 
Broadcasting, Posts and Telecommunications, whilst the IBA reported directly 
to Parliament. In 1980, aspects of telecommunications markets were 
liberalised and competition was introduced. SATRA was responsible for 
approving licenses, creating and monitoring pricing policy and general 
industry regulation (White, 2004).  
1.4.2. Privatisation of Telkom  
In 1991 through legislative intervention, postal services were separated from 
telecommunications services and this paved the way for the establishment of 
Telkom as a state owned enterprise. However, Telkom’s operations did not 
bring a positive turn over and the company struggled to expand its network.  
In 1990, government made changes in the telecoms sector through the 
privatisation of Telkom (Horwitz, 2001).  
In 1992, in line with the global reforms, the minister commissioned a study on 
Telkom’s business as a monopoly fixed network.  The results were that 
Telkom had to be separated from the ministry. Another finding was that there 
was a need to establish the independent regulator. Telkom was expected to 
behave and conform to industry rules like any private corporation, even 
though it was state owned (White, 2004). The reforms continued with Telkom 
being an equity partner with a Malaysian consortium in 1997 with a 30% 
stake (Horwitz, 2001).  
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White (2004) indicates that several activities aligned to the policy reforms took 
place: the study, conducted on behalf of the government, recommended that 
competition be introduced in certain areas such as VANS and Cellular 
services, Telkom was given an exclusive license on certain services for a 
period of five years, the previous regime issued two licenses to two mobile 
service providers which are MTN and Vodacom. Each was given 25 years 
license to provide mobile cellular services.  
To ensure a more liberalised market, SATRA licensed the third mobile 
operator Cell C and this was done through a bidding process. There was 
anticipation in South Africa that mobile operators would compete with 
Vodacom and MTN in order to bring the prices of mobile services down. As 
cited by Sean Patrick Newell Gardner (2003) in his thesis, other issues which 
were discussed during the bidding processes were a call to lower 
interconnection fees, roaming, number portability and waiving of 
interconnection fees (Bidoli, 1998).  
Horwitz (2001) as quoted by Hlongwane (2009) found that: 
South African telecommunications were affected by the same forces 
that challenged traditional telecommunications regimes in other 
nations: the erosion of monopoly boundaries by technology and 
demand from large corporate users, the interrelated damage to the 
cross-subsidy system and attacks on the natural monopoly rationale 
(p. 68) 
1.4.3. The merger of the South African Telecommunications Regulator 
(SATRA) and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) 
SATRA and IBA were merged to create a single regulator; ICASA, 
established in terms of the Independent Communications Authority of South 
Africa Act, 2000. ICASA is mandated to regulate the communications sector 
in the public interest. Furthermore, the Authority is charged with the 
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responsibility to prescribe the numbering plans and to ensure that number 
portability was introduced by no later than 2005, including the creation of 
national number portability (Horwitz, 2001).  Essentially, the numbering 
programme was an enabler for the introduction of MNP (Chak, 2007, p. 23).  
ICASA conducted a study about the level of competition in the sector. The 
Authority indicated that most research done in the sector concluded that 
South Africans paid high prices in comparison with their counterparts 
internationally and that was attributed to lack of sufficient competition. 
Furthermore, the Authority indicated that consumers were not privileged to a 
free flow of information but instead were provided with too many misleading 
advertisements. In many instances, contracts were found to be hostile 
towards consumers because they were not able to make informed decisions 
on the services they required. ICASA made the recommendations that more 
players in the mobile industry should be introduced, second that number 
portability be introduced and finally that transparency be encouraged 
(Government Gazette no. 27854, 2005: 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2Well-designed numbering plans will accommodate the growth in the markets that an effective 
competition brings (and badly- designed ones can restrict growth severely) However, well 
designed plans can also encourage competition, particularly when they use network features 
carrier selection and provider number portability (Antelope consulting 
(http://www,antelope.org.uk, 2005). 
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1.4.4. MNP Regulations and competition in South Africa 
In 2004, ICASA published in the Government Gazette, the first set of 
regulations on number portability, inviting the public for comments.  The draft 
regulations looked at porting between fixed line operators and mobile 
operators. However, the process was constrained by delays in the licensing of 
the second network operator (Government Gazette no. 27062, 2004).  
According to Government Gazette (2004), some of the requirements of 
number portability stipulated that the recipient operator would not make an 
order on behalf of the subscriber unless they receive a request to do so. 
Further, both Donor and Recipient Operator should not engage in ‘winback’, 
where offers are made to subscribers who have ported their number but not 
necessarily those who have not ported. Importantly, it was imperative that 
operators should provide tariff transparency for on-net and off-net callers, 
especially when there is a 10% percentage increase in tariff for ported 
numbers.  
The conditions as encapsulated in the gazette indicated that the Authority and 
Mobile Operators would conduct public education about MNP in order for 
consumers to make informed decisions (Government Gazette, No 26834, 
2004). As reported by the 3group Europe: “on-net calls can be harmful to 
competition and might require intervention, especially if the operators are not 
equally placed…the offering of on-net calls has become a powerful 
instrument for incumbents operators to maintain their stronghold over the 
market” (The 3 Group Europe, 2006, p.6). 
The public consultations in South Africa on MNP were held in 2004.  The 
three mobile operators MTN, Cell C and Vodacom as well as Telkom played a 
pivotal role during the drafting of regulations and the development of a 
consumer guide.  The draft regulations comprised of mobile and fixed line 
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services whilst at the time the second network operator was not yet licensed. 
In addition, the Functional Specification and Ordering Specifications as well 
as the code of conduct were not yet published.  
The Functional Specification deals with exchange of information, system 
testing and billing procedures among others whilst the Ordering System 
addresses porting requests. These systems were important for number 
portability to be implemented and to ensure interoperability. Another 
contention in terms of competition was with regard to the role of Service 
Providers were not defined by the Act and the Under Service Area licensees 
(USALs), were limited to a geographic area (Government Gazette, no. 
28091).  
There were objections from operators about their intended participation in the 
number portability process as they were not defined by the Act. Importantly, 
there was a requirement that ICASA should conduct a feasibility study in 
order to ensure that a proper approach was taken with regard to the 
implementation of MNP. There was doubt whether the introduction of MNP 
will benefit consumers. The same reservations were raised by Telkom, 
CUASA, Vodacom and MTN (Government Gazette, no. 28091).  
Cell C submitted that there was over 40% of churn rate in respect of the pre-
paid subscribers. The concern was that unrestricted churn would prohibit 
competition and increase the costs of MNP to operators. What resulted was a 
proposal that the regulator should prescribe a restriction on the number of 
times that a prepaid subscriber could be allowed to port. Furthermore there 
was a need for clarity with regards to locked contracts which could perpetuate 
churn, churn rate which may force operators to charge ‘claw back’ which are 
charges of enticements given to a subscriber during the provision of a 
contract parameters on quality of service, issues of packages and handsets, 
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locked porting times, advertising campaigns, public educations, tariff 
transparency were discussed (ICASA, 2004). 
Prior the introduction of MNP, some consumer groups accused the two 
dominant mobile players, MTN and Vodacom of having cornered the market 
with their anticompetitive behaviour (ICASA, 2005). Cell C saw the 
introduction of MNP as an opportunity to increase its competitiveness in this 
sector (Goldstuck, 2006). South Africa promulgated the MNP regulations in 
2005 but was only implemented in November 2006. The delays were 
aggravated by technical challenges which mobile operators had to deal with 
to ensure seamless functioning of the technology (Telecommunications Act 
1996, as amended).   
The regulations were finally implemented in November 2006 after delays 
which were apparently caused by technical challenges. Before the launch, 
ICASA and operators developed a consumer guide on MNP, which was a 
step by step procedure on porting. Another important document which was 
developed by operators in consultation with ICASA was the Ordering 
Specification (OSS) which detailed the technology that will be used for porting 
as agreed by all operators (ICASA, 2005). 
When ICASA began consultations processes on MNP in 2004, it 
simultaneously established another committee to draft regulations on handset 
subsidies but the draft regulations were withdrawn after Vodacom took ICASA 
to court. Vodacom felt that ICASA had exceeded its mandate developing 
regulations of handset subsidy as ICASA does not regulate handsets 
including the manufactures (ICASA, 2004).  
 
In 2008, the Authority published a revised draft regulations but these 
regulations as well, were marred with threats of litigations as operators views 
the action by ICASA as ‘Ultra Vires’ which means acting beyond their 
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jurisdiction. The status quo by operators remains, as they believe that 
handset subsidy is a commercial agreement between a customer and an 
operator but not a regulatory issue. The argument by ICASA is that operators 
are not transparent when billing consumers (ICASA, 2008). According to 
Jordana & Sancho (2006) “The Regulatory Authority is equipped with 
procedures and instruments with which to enforce the regulatory aims. These 
include information and investigative rights as well as a set of sanctions” 
(Jordana &  Sancho, 2006, p. 23).  
1.4.5. Introduction of MNP in South Africa 
In November 2006, ICASA launched MNP in all the provinces. Pamphlets on 
the Consumer Guide to MNP were distributed on cross roads, shopping malls 
and other strategic places. The Authority further conducted a public 
awareness programme country-wide to ensure that members of the public 
were aware about the introduction of MNP and its benefits. As stipulated in 
the MNP regulations, mobile operators as well advertised extensively in the 
media, persuading consumers to switch their numbers.  
Despite all these efforts, it seems like MNP did not trigger a lot of interest for 
consumers.  Moreover, the three operators in South reported high increase 
on their subscriber base but ironically, reported low ported numbers since 
2006. By 2008, Vodacom reported 4, 448, Cell C 10, 622 and MTN 6, 138 
ported numbers (Vodacom, 2008) of the estimated 46 million mobile 
subscriber base in South Africa (South Africa Telecommunication Report Q4, 
2008).  
Out of the 46 million mobile subscribers, not more than 500 000 customers 
had ported their numbers two years after implementation. The assumption is 
that the result of low ported numbers could be attributed to lack of education 
and awareness programme and lack of price transparency where consumers 
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cannot distinguish costs between on-net and off-net calls, and benefits in 
general.  
On-net calls are made to the same network operators, for example, when one 
Vodacom subscriber calls another Vodacom subscriber. Off-net are calls 
made to different network operators, for example, a Vodacom subscriber calls 
an MTN subscriber (Mobile Number Portability Company, 2009). 
During the first quarter of the introduction of MNP, about 867 consumers 
complained about delays in porting (Vodacom, 2008). The terms and 
conditions for porting are not clear for consumers, for instance, if a customer 
does not notify the mobile operator that they wish to discontinue their 
contract, the operator automatically locks the customer into a new contract, 
and if the customer insists on cancelling the contract, then they are made to 
pay penalties at times, regarded as claw-back (ICASA, 2007).  
1.5. Conclusion 
 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 as repealed led to reforms in the 
industry aimed at promoting competition and also to protect consumers. 
Regulators were subsequently given a mandate to develop a numbering plan, 
which manages the numbers allocated to mobile and fixed line operators. 
Through the numbering plan, MNP was introduced.  
An ex ante study was conducted in most countries to determine the readiness 
of operators and for consumers to embrace MNP. Other countries went 
further to conduct ex post study, in order to investigate the effects of MNP. 
Seemingly, the implementation of MNP was not easy in most countries. There 
were delays by operators, porting percentages were very low, regulations 
were not clear about charges for porting and consumers were well informed.  
Like other countries, South Africa encountered challenges with regards to the 
implementation of MNP.  Operators had delayed the implementation by 12 
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months after citing technical problems that hinder the seamless processing of 
MNP ports. Another challenge in dealing simultaneously with both GNP and 
MNP was not possible because at the time, the second fixed line network 
operator was not yet licensed. However, a year later, both the regulator and 
the industry were ready to introduce MNP.  
The launch was done in November 2006 and a consumer guide was 
developed and distributed. Adverts were done on both print and electronic 
media. All these efforts by the regulator to give MNP publicity are yet to prove 
whether enough was done to prepare for MNP and importantly, to examine if 
its introduction was a success.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3See Code of Practice for all Network Operators on processes for MNP (Government Gazette, 
no. 28091). 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
ON MNP 
2. Introduction 
This chapter provides a literature review based on academic research studies 
conducted on the impact of MNP. Furthermore, it extrapolates concepts used 
in the discourse of competition policies and regulations which led to the 
introduction of MNP in SA. South Africa does not have much academic 
studies regarding MNP and it is important to note that literature that exists 
emanates from studies conducted internationally.  
The telecommunications reforms attracted attention from various schools of 
thought, especially with regards to drivers of competition. Research studies 
on MNP as encapsulated in the literature review include both ex ante and the 
ex post studies. An ex ante study is described as a study which occurs before 
the facts. In the case of MNP, it means that studies were conducted before its 
introduction in order to investigate if consumers were aware about MNP and 
to generally determine if countries were ready to embrace it. An ex post study 
occurs after the facts; such studies were conducted after MNP was 
implemented in order to review its effects.  
This chapter further looks at the definition of terms used in the literature 
review and will form part of this study. Importantly, it will look at the research 
objectives and methodology used by various scholars and draw out 
similarities and differences in the research findings. The literature review will 
investigate the tools with which the researcher will determine if MNP in South 
Africa is beneficial to consumers or not.  
2.1. The review of academic literature on MNP  
There are several academic studies conducted on MNP in order to investigate 
its effects on consumers. Fundamentally, MNP is not looked at in isolation but 
as another component of competition which was introduced to benefit 
consumers. This chapter looks at why and how scholars conducted studies 
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on MNP and importantly, provides research results which will assist the 
researcher to formulate her theoretical framework for the study.  
As indicated in the previous chapter, there is a relationship between 
regulation and competition. This relationship forms part of this research study 
as it illustrates how MNP, as introduced through regulation enables 
competition. There are five factors: deregulation, re-regulation of competition, 
regulation-for-competition and meta-regulation which are interlinked with 
privatisation and liberalisation. De-regulation deals with the reduction of 
economic, political and social restriction on the behavior of social actors. This 
form of regulation takes place when the market is liberalised and free market 
is introduced (Stigler, 1975).  
Re-regulation describes regulatory reforms and liberalisation, however 
provides new sets of regulations with no clear competition opportunities. 
Regulation–for-competition requires more intrusive capacities, it covers 
various markets nationally whilst the Regulation-of-competition is more sector 
focused. Many countries have introduced a competition commission to deal 
with regulation–for-competition whilst communications regulators focus on 
regulation-of-competition for the ICT sector, and as result becomes the 
authority on MNP issues (Stigler, 1975).  
There are various theories aligned to the development of regulations with 
regard to the telecommunications reforms. The most relevant is the ‘Public 
Interest Theory’ as discussed by Horwitz (1989). In his argument, he 
highlights the importance of regulations in respect to the public needs. There 
is a view that private companies operate without taking into consideration the 
interest of the public.   
Natural monopolies had created ‘bottleneck’s which delayed delivery to 
the public. The challenges encountered by the public led to the 
creation of regulatory agencies that are mandated to regulate in the 
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interest of the public. Ideally, with a regulatory agency comes the 
development and implementation of regulations, and subsequently, 
competition which eliminates bottlenecks of poor service delivery 
(Horwitz 1989, p. 24 & 26). 
Melody (2003) draws on a study conducted by Milne (1997), about the 
‘Design and Management of the Numbering System’ and indicates that 
regulators are duty bound to manage the numbering plan. Numbering plan 
refers to the National Significant Number (NSN). There are three reasons that 
are important for the regulator’s intervention: the national numbering plan is a 
national resource; it should be managed in the overall national interest; and in 
a competitive environment, the regulator needs to make sure that this 
happens (Melody, 2003, p. 147). 
As cited by Melody, Milner (1997) provides numerous competitive implications 
with regards to numbering plan and they include adequate local number 
capacity for local loop competitors, carrier selection codes for long distance 
competitors, capacity for new network services for new operators, short codes 
for new local loop competitors and operator number portability which is 
required by new competitors for new business.  
In the early days of local competition, number portability may appear to 
new competitors to be crucial to their success and to the incumbent to 
be technically a very tall order. On the other hand she said: regulators 
are likely to see local number portability as at least a serious option 
wherever there is competition and modern exchanges. “They will also 
be considering free phone and mobile number portability, where 
substantial benefits seem to be available at relatively low cost” 
(Melody, 2003, p. 147).  
In reference to Melody, the introduction of number portability will enable a 
competitive environment not only to consumers but also new market entrants.  
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2.2. Research on the effects of MNP in various countries and regions  
A study in the UK was conducted by Olla and Patel (2002) on the mobile 
telecommunications market. It was established that Mobile phones are an 
integral part of people’s everyday lives. The study further found that over 70% 
of consumers owned mobile phones and that high mobile usage was as a 
result of competition growth. The UK study was conducted before the 
implementation of MNP and its purpose was to assess the level of readiness 
by consumers in embracing MNP.  
 Goldstuck & Ambrose (2006) of World Wide Worx conducted a survey for 
Nashua Mobile on MNP in South Africa. Like in the UK, the study was 
conducted prior to the implementation of MNP in November 2006. Their 
sampling was segmented into corporate, small and medium enterprise as well 
as consumers. They interviewed about 1100 South Africans both in urban 
and rural areas.  Interviews were conducted per province and according to 
the community’s indigenous language. Language proficiency was imperative 
in order to ensure that respondents provided answers based on the 
understanding of the subject and its objective (Goldstuck & Ambrose, 2006).   
Questions included the awareness on MNP and the intention of subscribers 
to change networks. According to the research findings, about 50% of the 
respondents indicated that they would switch operators as they expected 
mobile calls to be cheaper. The post-paid subscribers anticipated challenges 
in switching due to long contracts (Goldstuck & Ambrose, 2006, p. 33 – 34).    
According to Hodge (2001): 
In general, some competition is seen as desirable because it is able to 
lower the information rents that firms extract in the regulatory process 
due to information asymmetries between them and the regulators. 
Competition allows performance comparisons that provide better 
information on which to make regulatory decisions and make 
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inferences about the effort of firms in cost reduction and innovation 
(Hodge 2001, p.6).  
Lyons (2006) conducted an econometric analysis making reference to similar 
studies which have been made by researchers in various countries from 1999 
– 2004. These studies relate to the ex ante costs analysis of MNP by 
regulators for the UK in 1997, 1998 in Hong Kong and 2000 in Ireland, and ex 
post empirical examinations  for the EU, the UK, the US and South Korea. 
The main focus of his analysis was based on information from 38 countries 
that ported between 1999 until 2004. The findings were as follows: 
• when the quality of service was put together with porting times, it had    
an impact on the switching rates and average prices, 
• In some countries, MNP was associated with increased switching and 
lower prices especially for countries which had porting times fewer 
than five days,  
• countries with less stringent porting times had not experienced churn 
or revenue effects (Lyons, 2006, p. 2). 
Further studies conducted by Buehler, Dewenter & Haucap (2006) found that 
technology was a contributing factor to MNP quality which also entails porting 
times and reliability (Buehler et al, 2006). Lyons cited a study by Gans, King & 
Woodbridge (2001) on the importance of choosing technology for number 
portability, and had similar findings in his empirical research. Some of the 
findings concluded that MNP was free for some subscribers whilst others 
were charged fees (Lyons, 2006, p. 4, 26-27). 
Lyons cited two studies on the classification of MNP benefits, by NERA 
(1998) and Buehler et al (2004). Their studies looked at the ex-ante empirical 
methodology on customer costs emanating from MNP. The classification is 
based on Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3 benefits.   
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Lyon (2006) indicated that: 
Type 1 is categorised into Type 1A and Type 1B. Type 1A benefits are 
accrued by mobile telephone users who would change network 
operator even if MNP were not available. The benefits occur in the 
form of reduced switching costs. A study conducted in South Korea 
found that switching costs could be reduced by up to 35%.  Another 
benefit for Type 1A is the avoidance of ‘dual sourcing’ whereby in the 
absence of MNP, some customers may choose to retain the mobile 
services in order to re receive calls on their existing on their existing 
mobile service. Type 1B benefits occur to users who choose to port 
their number because of the availability of MNP. 
Hibbard (2008) posits that: 
 “the reasons that customers switch will represent genuine 
economic benefits only to the extent that new operators offer 
lower charges or higher quality because they are more efficient 
than existing operators” (Hibbard, 2008, p: 15).   
Type 2 customer benefits: are those incurred by mobile telephone 
users who would not change network operator if MNP were not 
available. These include the costs of SIM cards, handset changes and 
other migration costs. These costs have been implicitly been netted 
out. 
Type 3 benefits are benefits that confer to other subscribers when a 
subscriber ports his number. 
IDA (2000) describes Type 3 as follows: 
 
These external benefits will likely be greater for subscribers who call many 
other subscribers and include the following: 
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· Continued validity of non-porting subscribers’ public and private 
directories and memorised numbers; 
· Reduced problems with faxes sent to/received by the wrong fax 
machines since they do not identify whether the responding fax 
machine belongs to the intended recipient; 
· Reduced telephone operator assistance; and 
· Reduced wrong number/billing disputes (p: 7) 
 
According to Lyons, the ex-ante evaluation on the benefits of MNP concluded 
that MNP would provide welfare gains if expenditure on the benefits of MNP 
outweighed the cost of network investment, process changes and operating 
costs to make number portability, in this case by operators. In Lyons’s view, 
previous ex ante evaluation focused more on Type 1 benefit and Type 3. 
Little attention was given to Type 2 benefit which deals with costs incurred by 
customers who not change network operators if MNP was not applicable. The 
researcher in this study will focus on the Type 1B benefit accrued by mobile 
users who chose to port their number because of the availability of MNP 
(Lyons, 2006). 
Contrary to previous ex ante evaluation which focused more on Type 1 and 
Type 2 benefits, NERA (2003) conducted the ex post empirical research and 
looked at Type 1 benefit only. The study found that after two years of the 
implementation of MNP: only 12% of residential customers had switched their 
number. The number was low in comparison to the ex-ante assessment and 
in comparison to the 50% of business customers that had switched at least 
some of their numbers (Lyons, 2006, p. 4, 26-27). 
Other challenges with regard to the implementation of MNP had to do with 
delays during porting and, lack of high uptake of number portability in the first 
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year was due to delays in porting times which took about 25 days.  But when 
the days were reduced to five, there was greater up-take with residential 
increasing to 18% and business to 80% again as proportions of customers 
that switched, not as proportion of customers in total (Lyons, 2006, p. 4, 26-
27). 
Lyons further looked at the empirical study by Ovum (2005) which was 
conducted in countries such as Australia, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and the UK and reported that: the long porting period 
discouraged customers to port, as it happened in UK, but could not conclude 
that a shorter period was a determining factor in attracting customers to 
switch their numbers; whilst high charges to customers were a deterrent to 
porting, it could not be concluded on the other hand that zero charges 
attracted demand for porting (Lyons, 2006, p. 4, 26-27). 
Lyons also cited individual markets on MNP and looked at the study 
conducted by Lee, Kim and Park (2004) who conducted a study in South 
Korea about factors which attracted customers in porting their numbers. They 
found out that there was willingness by customers to pay an average of 
3.24% of their monthly bill for a mobile number portability option. Willingness 
to pay (WTP) showed a strong positive association with income, awareness 
of MNP, and intention to switch (Lyons, 2004, p.5 -7). 
According to Lyons, a similar study was conducted in South Korea by Kim 
(2005).  It was reported that MNP reduced switching costs by at least 35%. 
Furthermore, switching took place during the first year of MNP, and it took 
place mostly with larger operators. Another study was done in Hong Kong 
and found out that the market was highly competitive with 7 mobile operators. 
Contrary to these findings was a study by Haucup et al (2006), which  found 
ambiguity about  MNP in most European countries, the research results for 
this study indicated that MNP brought about 6% discount rates which was a 
benefit to consumers. The saturated market forced operators to bring prices 
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of telecommunication down and quality of service was a determining factor in 
influencing customer choice more than prices. In the US, it was found out that 
“despite rapid growth in the market, the firms’ incentive to exploit their existing 
‘locked in’ users was greater than their incentive to ‘lock in’ new customers 
(Lyons, 2004, p.5-7). 
A study conducted by Smura (2006) looked at Finland, Italy, Singapore and 
Germany. In Finland MNP was only applicable to contract users who were 
96% of the total users.  Finland is one of the countries which had a positive 
report on the impact of MNP to its consumers. This was attributed to 
enforcement powers which the regulator had. Bundled services, SIM – lock, 
lock in contracts and long contracts were banned (Smura, 2004).  
In Italy, two years after the implementation of MNP, only 3.68% of subscribers 
had ported. Italy has a high usage of mobile telephony and 93% of users are 
prepaid. To compete in the competitive market, operators launched 
aggressive marketing campaigns to attract customers. By now, Italy is said to 
have the highest cumulative porting rate in EU. In Singapore, MNP usage 
was very low and the contributory factor was that subscribers were obliged to 
pay monthly fees to the previous service providers. Germany is reported to 
have had very low ported numbers mainly because of lack of marketing 
campaigns and longer time frames for porting, which was about 31 days 
(Haucup, 2006). 
Buehler et al (2003) explored a similar study done by Lyons. They found that 
the introduction of MNP encourages competition in the market which is of 
interest to regulators. Regulators as mentioned previously are mandated to 
ensure competition in the industry. They found that actually MNP does not 
take place free of charge. As much as operators incur costs for technological 
upgrades, consumers to a certain extent are expected to pay for porting 
(Buehler et al, 2003).  
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A study by Shin (2007) concluded that direct costs are costs incurred by 
operators and include the development of technology for MNP and its 
implementation and the database infrastructure that had to be built for this 
process. The indirect costs are those paid by consumers for calls to ported 
numbers as they cannot distinguish between networks when placing calls. 
But countries such as Portugal, Ireland and Belgium informed customers 
through SMS when they placed calls on or off net (Shin, 2007).    
Aoki and Small (2005) conducted an analysis on the switching cost and found 
out they were reduced subsequent to the introduction of MNP and improved 
the welfare of consumers. Podvystskiy (2006) cites studies by Klemper (1995) 
and Aoki and Small’s (1999); view that switching costs are a function of policy 
makers and feels they are the ones responsible for ensuring these get 
reduced. He further mentioned that switching costs impact negatively on 
consumers. Contrary to the study (Ovum, 2005) Grzybowski (2005) found out 
that switching costs were not a problem in the UK as the regulator made 
some interventions (Podvisostskiy, 2006, p. 8, 11).  
A study (Shi, Chiang & Rhee n.d) examined how the introduction of MNP 
could have affected the market prices, consumer welfare and market 
concentration. Their study was conducted in conjunction with the existing 
literature which indicates that market share leaders tend to charge consumers 
high prices but lose the market share in the process.  
 
Refer to (Levin, 2006:7). 4The Basic Concepts in the Telecommunication Competition: on abuse of 
power with regard to bundling by the market (http//cbdd.wsu.edu/kewlcontent/cdouput/tr501pg17-
18.2009/05/18). 
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Operators were providing discriminatory price scheme for those calling off – 
net and on – net.  And those who stood to benefit were the subscribers calling 
on-net as they are provided discounts and as a result the market leader could 
gain the market share. A typical example for this scenario is Hong Kong 
where prices were cut by 60% and market leaders gained significant market 
share whilst the smaller players lost customers. Basically their study indicates 
that there is causal relationship between high prices and market share (Shi, 
Chiang & Rhee n.d) An article by Ben Omodi on views from Africa indicates 
that when MNP was introduced in Kenya in December 2010, four mobile 
operators cut voice tariffs and SMS charges and this move was expected to 
have positive impact for consumers.  
Omodi (2010) wrote: 
By granting customers the freedom to move from one operator to 
another, the telecoms industry is headed for very exciting times. With 
MNP, differentiation amongst mobile service providers will no longer be 
based on pricing but a combination of value propositions mainly value 
added services, customer service and network coverage and quality, 
said Meza, who was the first to reduce call and SMS tariffs heralding 
the current price wars (p.3) 
The repealed Telecommunications Act of 1996 gave powers to the regulator, 
ICASA, to develop telecommunications price regulations. Section 45 of the 
Act stipulated that the market failed to produce competitive prices therefore it 
was pertinent for price regulations to be developed in order to address that 
anomaly. The regulations then gave the regulators powers to determine fees 
and charges for telecommunications services. In relations to mobile services, 
MTN and Vodacom’s licenses required them to increase rates by no more 
than the annual consumer price index (CPI). Cell C’s license contained no 
such conditions (Thorton & Hodge, n.d).  
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Buehler and Haucup (2004) examined the trade-off between competition 
improvement and consumer ignorance associated with MNP. Like other 
academic research on MNP, they focused on the introduction of MNP as the 
abolishment of switching costs. They found that mandatory MNP did not 
create welfare for consumers. Moreover, they reported that the introduction of 
MNP gave rise to a consumer ignorance problem. They argue that ignorance 
occurs when consumers are not aware of termination charges and this 
becomes a trigger for operators to increase their charges. Further to their 
analysis was the regulation on termination charges. They conclude that if 
regulations on termination charges are applicable, then under such 
conditions, MNP will be beneficial to consumers.   
European Union’s Universal Service Directive stipulates that MNP pricing 
should be costs orientated, a task which seem daunting to many member 
states as each country would have a different pricing methodology. Countries 
such as Finland charge switching subscribers whilst Irish and Spanish 
countries are prohibited to charge. Other countries such as Belgium charge 
prepaid customers and not post-paid. A study (Buehler et al, 2005) concludes 
that due to the porting costs by operators and customer’s ignorance on issues 
related to MNP, the welfare benefits from MNP become ambiguous.  
Baldwin & Cave (1999) state that: 
Competitive markets can only function properly if consumers are 
sufficiently well informed to evaluate competing products. They further 
mention that when information is made extensively accessible, 
accurate and affordable, it may protect consumers against information 
inadequacies and this may result in a competitive market where 
consumers can make informed decisions and choice (p.13).  
Noticeably, most literature emphasises the benefits of MNP on consumers to 
be quality of service, low costs and choice. However, ‘keeping the number’ is 
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also seen as the consumer benefit. As discussed, (Gerport, Rams & 
Schindler 2001) discovered that customers put value on their phone numbers 
especially if they used it for a longer time. The same sentiment is shared by 
(Buehler, Dewenter & Haucup: 2005) who mentioned that in terms of property 
rights, a subscriber becomes a sole owner of the phone number and its 
control.  Prior to the introduction of MNP, consumers had to keep up with 
unsatisfactory service by service providers just to keep their number (Buehler 
et al, 2005).  
Like South Korea and Hong Kong, Olla and Patell (2002) reported that in the 
UK, prices went down after the introduction of MNP. Competitors brought 
down prices in order to encourage customers to switch (Olla & Patel, 2002). 
However, with the long porting times reported in the study of Ovum (2005), 
the results of Lyons (2006) suggest that very little of the price fall in the UK 
could be attributed to the introduction of MNP. There is obviously contrasting 
findings as it happened above with (Podvisoskiy, 2006).  
Igbal (2007) conducted a study in South Asia about the impact of MNP and 
highlighted measures for the successes of MNP. First, he says that high 
porting numbers are indicative of the successes of MNP. He mentions several 
countries such as Hong Kong, South Korea and Australia introduced low 
prices (Tahalani, 2007). 
MNP has a negative impact on interconnection rates. Complexities are 
associated with international interconnections rates which depend on a 
country’s rates.  Interconnection is defined as “ the commercial and technical 
arrangement under which service providers connect their equipment, 
networks and services to enable customers to have access to the customers 
services and networks of their service providers” (Bhatnagar 2004:5). 
‘Interconnection must be regulated where competition in telecommunications 
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services exists.  However, competition is not an end but a means to an end’ 
(lower prices, high rates of innovation and investment, etc.) (ITU, 1995: 5).   
In 1997, OFTEL published a discussion paper on mobile termination rates. 
This discussion was premised from the notion that mobile operators charged 
high prices for delivering calls to customers on their networks. After much 
debate between the regulator, operators and intervention by the Competition 
Commission, it was agreed that terminated charges be reduced by 15% in the 
next three years (Bomsel et al, 2003). The same public consultation was 
done by ICASA and the termination rates have decreased from 1.25 to 80 for 
off peak and peak calls. The challenge with the regulations is that they 
address rate cuts at wholesale level and there is no benefit for the consumer 
(ICASA, 2010). 
A study (Park, 2009) examined the price impact with regard to the 
introduction of MNP in the US. Furthermore, the study looked at competition 
in relation to policy directives and investigated whether consumers across the 
board benefited. The research results indicated that competition grew and 
brought about price cuts in the mobile industry. With regard to consumer 
benefits, the service providers offered both old and new subscriber’s choice 
on similar products. It was reported that in the first year of after the MNP, 7, 8 
million of subscribers had ported (FCC, 2005). Furthermore, the study found 
out that the prices fell at 0.87% for low plans, medium and high plans fell at 
4.87% and 6.9% respectively (Park, 2009, p. 20 -22).  
Satitsamitpong & Mitimo (2008) conducted an empirical study on consumers’ 
behavior in Thailand. They were interested in understanding why consumers 
were switching from one network operator to the other. At the time, the 
subscriber base was nearing 50 million and government deemed it necessary 
to introduce MNP. The analysis looked at the following: 
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Brand – Branding was regarded as the important factor when people 
choose a particular product. 
Reduction in monthly bills – The mobile market in Thailand was an 
‘oligopoly’ with four operators competing for mobile subscribers. Price 
was a determining factor for porting. Consumers had to indicate the 
discount they received from the operators through their billing 
statements. 
MNP adoption fee – This is a fee which subscribers paid when wanting 
to switch to a new service provider and to keep their old number. 
Essentially, this fee would determine the effectiveness of MNP on 
basis that if the fee was high, then the demand for porting would be 
low. 
Porting time – The time it took for porting was also important. It ranged 
from few hours to days. 
3G availability – This value added service was used as another factor 
for porting, and this was mainly used for new service providers. 
Satitsamitpong & Mitimo (2008) excluded the handset from their study due to 
the regulatory intervention on monitoring and enforcement strategy which 
required operators to unlock the customer’s SIM- card.  In their research 
results, they found out that consumers had a high expectation with regard to 
the monthly bills, and that contributed to their decision to switch or not. Brand 
was also said to be a determining factor for switching operators. Basically, 
this means that consumers were not concerned with lower prices or quality of 
service but ported because they wanted to join their favourable brand.  
Porting time had a negative effect on porting decisions. For example, if time 
frames for making  calls was  shorter, basically , taking place within few hours 
or at least a day with the current operator, it was unlikely that consumers 
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would want to port to a new network operator. With regard to fees, if there 
were lesser charges, it was possible that most consumers will port. Lastly, 
they found out that post paid subscribers were keen to port more than prepaid 
subscribers (Satitsamitpong & Mitimo, 2008).  
A study (Sobolewski, n.d) investigated whether the diffusion process in the 
mobile telephony has been speeded up by the introduction of MNP.  He 
defines diffusion as ‘the process by which new ideas, products, technologies 
spread in the social system’ (Sobolewski, n.d). He mentioned that the 
motivation for this research question was informed by ongoing debates with 
regard to the effectiveness of MNP.  
Of note, was the common belief that MNP was an effective tool to promote 
competition. This is a view that he contradicts based on the ex post studies 
which indicated that its effectiveness remains ambiguous. In his investigation, 
he found out that there was a dichotomy between the research findings on 
EU markets and country reports. Whilst EU markets reported moderately 
positive impact of MNP, various countries did not see the growth of 
competition as envisaged by the MNP regulations. He attributes lack of MNP 
success to the unfavourable conditions for consumers who were willing to 
port their numbers. 
He highlighted switching costs as one of the unfavourable conditions for 
consumers who port their numbers. As stated previously, switching costs are 
incurred by consumers who port their number to the new network service 
provider but do not apply to those who remain with the current operator 
(Podvysotskiy, 2006) mentioned that this type of strategy by operators 
contributes to extra costs by consumers, when they buy products with the 
new service provider. As he puts it, with consumer switching costs demand is 
less elastic and there is no incentive for consumers who want to port and 
therefore competition is not realised. He added other switching costs which 
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include sim-locking of handset and penalties for those who break their 
contracts. He describes the strategy used by operators in switching costs as 
“bargain then rip-off pricing”. This occurs when customers pay low costs at 
the beginning but then later on when they want to switch, they pay high 
charges (Sobolewski, n.d). 
A study Igbal (2007) highlighted several factors which should be considered 
in order to ensure the success of MNP. First, there has to be consumer 
demand for MNP. Consumers should be willing to port, and indicates that if 
porting is low, then the service of MNP should not be introduced. His view is 
that developing MNP technology is costly and indicated that putting systems 
in place without effectively using them result in loss by operators and that 
wasteful expenditure could not be recovered. Furthermore, this would lead to 
economic failure. According to Horrocks (2007), an MNP expert, MNP should 
be implemented in countries with big population and bigger mobile markets. 
In the absence of this, that costs will outweigh the benefits (Igbal, 2007).  
Second is the level of competition. Igbal cited a study by Haucap (2003), 
where the level of competition between operators should be a measure for 
the success of MNP. He argues that when competition is at a mature level, 
then there is no need for the introduction of MNP because operators in such 
competitive markets do provide consumers with lower prices and quality of 
service. His view does not mean that MNP as a service should not be 
introduced at all, but says that it should be considered only as a standard 
service in advance telecom markets.  He gave an example of Ireland as 
where MNP failed because there were only three mobile operators licensed. 
He mentions that consumers were reluctant to port as they saw no benefit of 
porting from one operator to the other, and as a results, there were poor 
porting rates. There was homogeneity with regard to prices and packages. 
Third is the regulatory control. He indicates that a regulatory agency should 
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be independent and powerful in order to ensure that the sector complies with 
regulations on MNP and for its success (Igbal, 2007, p.11). 
Gans (2001) stated that regulators and policy makers should be aware that 
MNP may increase competition in the mobile market, however, what is 
important to note is the means by which it is implemented. The approach or 
the method they use would be a determining factor for its increase or hamper 
effective competition and therefore be a detriment to consumer welfare (Gans 
et al., 2001). 
The regulator in Finland had to step in when MNP was failing. They forced 
operators to abolish handset subsidies and long term contracts (Smura, 
2004). In the UK and Netherlands, regulators were not as effective and in 
Finland hence there was poor MNP uptake in those countries (Horrock, 
2007). 
Lastly is the policy and regulatory implications. Igbal (2007) posits that a 
precondition for the introduction of MNP should be the technical aspects with 
regards to the implementation, pricing and payment mechanism. MNP 
requires technical proficiency and that includes technical proficiency of the 
regulator (Igbal, 2007).   
2.1. Conceptual framework on MNP 
2.1.1. Types of MNP benefits 
There have been both qualitative and quantitative studies in the literature. As 
explained earlier, Lyons (2002) conducted an econometric analysis which is 
an empirical research. He segmented the benefits of MNP in three categories: 
first benefits obtained by customers who switch. Second, benefits by all 
mobile telephony users and lastly, benefits obtained by those calling to ported 
numbers. As mentioned earlier, this study will focus only on the benefits 
experienced by consumers who ported their numbers, which is benefit 1. 
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2.1.2. Quality of service  
Melody (2003) describes competition as the driver of low costs, and quality 
service and customer attraction and retention among other drivers. This study 
will investigate if reasons for porting among other were due to quality of 
service. Quality of service in this context is based on the consumer’s 
interpretation as it has different meanings. Operators look at the quality of 
service as the availability of network coverage, upgraded technology and 
manageable drop calls. 
2.1.3. Porting information 
In South Korea MNP became a success month after it was introduced. 
Contributory factors according to Lyons (2004) were strong positive 
association with income and awareness of MNP among others. Other 
countries could not make a positive impact on consumers because of 
consumer’s ignorance on the concept of MNP. This study will investigate if 
consumers had sufficient information about MNP prior to switching. 
2.1.4. Porting times 
Previous literature informs us that porting times were one the determining 
factors in the success or failure of MNP.  The researcher has noted however, 
that research made on the time frames regarding MNP could not conclusively 
indicate if the short time was an indication of porting success. This study will 
investigate if porting times in South Africa took longer or shorter than in other 
countries such as Hong Kong or South Korea, but the determining factor 
mainly will be the time frame contained in the MNP regulations.  
2.1.5. Consumer awareness  
When MNP was introduced, many countries conducted ex ante and ex post 
assessment to determine if consumers were aware about MNP and 
investigated if they were ready to embrace it.  Customer Education was 
included in the regulation framework. An ex post study was conducted in 
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South Korea about the effect of MNP and the research results showed that 
consumers ported because they were aware about MNP (Lyons, 2006).  
2.1.6. Churn coverage  
Churn rate refers to the proportion of contractual customers or subscribers 
who leave a supplier during a given time period (Hibbard et al, 2008). 
2.1.7. Value added service 
Value added service includes internet data services and video or picture 
services which are accessible from mobile connection, all bundled together. 
This ‘triple play’ is a competition trend which came as a result of innovation. 
Initially these bundled were sold separately. For instance, the 3G card at the 
beginning was sold separately, but due to competition, different operators 
began to adopt this trend. These days, whether one is a pre-paid or contract, 
services are the same. Most handsets and services allow for other value 
added services.  
2.1.8. The switching costs 
The switching barrier refers to the difficulty of switching to another provider 
that is encountered by a customer who is dissatisfied with existing service, or 
to the financial, social and psychological burden felt by a customer when 
switching to a new carrier (Fornel, 1992). Essentially if consumers continue to 
encounter switching barrier then they will be forced to remain with their 
existing operator. (Dick & Basu, 1994) describe them as costs incurred when 
switching, including time, money and psychological costs. 
2.2. Conclusion  
The review of literature   indicates that MNP had negative and positive 
effects. Its successes could not be conclusively reported as there is no clear 
measure which constitutes success with regard to MNP. All studies 
mentioned that the objective of introducing MNP is to lower the costs, bring 
about quality of service, provide consumer choice and drive competition. 
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Competition was not only with regard to price drops but to also level the 
playing field among telecommunications market players. There was a 
regulatory expectation in ensuring that consumers exercise their right to 
choice, public education with regard to MNP was to be conducted by 
operators and regulators in order for consumers to make informed decisions. 
With the introduction of MNP, consumers who could not terminate their 
contract with mobile operators without the fear of losing their number were 
now free to do. 
Operators were expected to adhere to the time frames provided for the final 
implementation but this expectation was difficult to achieve in many countries 
including South Africa due to technical challenges. Fundamentally, operators 
had to upgrade their technology in order to accommodate all numbers from 
other operators with different prefixes. Citing from research results of various 
reviews of literature, Lago (2007), indicated that there were also downsides 
with regard to the implementation of MNP. Consumers could not distinguish 
the network operator they were calling on ported numbers. He argues that the 
naivety by consumers led to operators increasing termination charges. The 
technology used for MNP was also expensive and operators had to incur 
costs for set–up costs, customer transfer costs, routing costs, and costs for 
managing the MNP database. Furthermore, he mentioned anti-competitive 
behavior whereby consumers were tied for longer to contracts, and those who 
terminated their contract anyway were compelled to pay penalty fees. 
Consumers were obliged to purchase new handsets as their old phones could 
not be compatible with the new operator’s network.  
The effects of MNP vary and Levin (2006) summarises them as follows: In 
Finland, the number of subscribers grew at 37% during its 1st quarter of MNP 
introduction; Singapore had a low intake due to the fact that customers were 
expected to pay monthly fees to their previous service providers and this was 
a limitation for porting. UK only one  out of five subscribers ported their 
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number and this was attributed to poor marketing campaigns and delays in 
porting periods which took about four weeks. Hong Kong had high number of 
ported subscribers of about 85% five years after implementation, In Germany 
15 month after the introduction of MNP, only 0, 43% of mobile subscribers 
ported their number (Levin, 2006), Buehler et al (2005) mentioned that the 
introduction of MNP remained ambiguous as many consumers did not benefit 
and implored further academic study on the purpose for the introduction of 
MNP.  
Melody (2003) mentioned that real competition cannot take place in a duopoly 
market. South Africa has three mobile operators only. The purpose is to 
determine if three players in the market could bring costs down and provide 
consumers a quality service through MNP.   
This study was motivated by previous academic literature discourse on MNP, 
which indicate that most countries in Europe did not benefit as anticipated.  
To name a few, United Kingdom (UK) subscribers were not inclined to port 
because they perceived switching costs to be high and that discouraged them 
from porting. In the US porting was very low during its first year. Delays in 
respect to the implementation of MNP by several countries were also a 
contributing factor for lack of interest in consumers porting. 
Summary  
As stated before, prior to the introduction of MNP, consumers were required 
to give up their numbers when they changed service providers and as a 
result, they were reluctant to switch (Buehler & Haucup, 2003). In South 
Africa, a study by Goldstuck indicated that competition remained stifled by 
continuous exorbitant prices while consumers were forced into long contracts, 
moreover, bundled services such as handsets subsidies exacerbated the 
problem (Goldstuck, 2005).  
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Policy makers saw MNP as a mechanism to change the outlook of the 
industry but this initiative was not welcomed by market players.  Almost in all 
countries, operators were opposed to the introduction of MNP.  In the UK, 
operators raised concerns that the introduction of MNP before a study is 
conducted would result in regulatory burden. ‘We don’t have any level playing 
field with MNP and its a millstone round our necks. Anything over a day to 
organise to change networks with MNP is unacceptable and giving operators 
a win-back chance makes market less competitive’ (Russell, 2007, p. 1). They 
further argued that it would bring about additional costs, and would be a 
barrier to new entrants, a view which was disputed by OFTEL (Gupta et al., 
2001). 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY ON MNP 
 
3. Introduction 
The focus of the research study was to solicit perceptions of policy makers, 
Regulators, mobile operators as well as mobile subscribers, on the benefits of 
MNP. The research required an in-depth understanding of how respondents’ 
interpreted their understanding of MNP benefits through different approaches 
in data collection. Respondents were selected from the Department of 
Communications (DoC), ICASA, Vodacom, MTN, Cell C, as well as Nashua 
Mobile. Lastly, mobile subscribers were selected from various mobile 
operators.  
Three sets of questions were developed for the selected respondents and the 
researcher anticipated multiple interpretations of data collected. The 
instrument used was a set of questions in a questionnaires format which were 
then administered via telephone and face-to-face interviews. This chapter 
further outlines the purpose of the research and research designs, 
significance of the study, limitations and ethical issues and speaks to the 
questions asked in the implementation of the research. The method adopted 
for this study is purely qualitative.  
3.1. Problem statement  
As indicated in the background and literature review chapters, prior to the 
introduction of MNP, mobile calls were expensive. Consumers were forced to 
stick with network operators despite the lack of quality service as they did not 
want to lose their numbers, and competition in the market was nonexistent 
due to apparent of price collusion. Government has on numerous  occasion, 
highlighted its concern with regard to high costs of telephony in South Africa, 
in comparison with developed countries whose prices are lower, and 
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telecommunication services became part of government’s national agenda 
(White, 2004). 
Since the introduction of mobile telephony in SA, only three network 
operators are licensed which makes competition ineffective. In 2004, former 
Minister of Communications Dr. Matsepe -Casaburri made a policy 
announcement on a more competitive ICT environment, improved access to 
ICT infrastructure and services, affordable telecommunications services and a 
variety of choice in services being provided by the ICT sector to meet both 
economic social needs of our society ( DoC, 2004).  
In 2005, EC Act was introduced and section 2 (n) of the objects of the Act 
stipulates that ICASA should: “promote the interests of consumers with regard 
to price quality and the variety of electronic communications services”. In 
2007, ICASA completed the license conversion of previously Value Added 
Network Service (VANS) license holders, but this move did not increase 
competition in the mobile telephony as  all former VANS continue provide 
network for internet access.  Ironically, the ministerial determination did not 
bring any change with regard to call prices.    
The implementation of MNP globally was expected to spur competition in the 
mobile market. Expected effects of competition included a decrease in mobile 
tariffs and increase in the mobile related usage, improvement in customer 
service and satisfaction, differentiation in innovation in mobile packages and 
value added services and introduction of new technology and ease of market 
entry for new respondents (Chak, 2007, p. 23).  
Goldstuck (2006) conducted their study on the impact of MNP prior to its 
implementation in 2006. Respondents indicated willingness to port as they 
expected costs of mobile telephony to reduce and quality of service to 
improve.  
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Despite all these efforts, MNP did not trigger a lot of interest by consumers.  
Moreover, the three operators in South reported high increase in their 
subscriber base but ironically, reported low ported numbers since 2006. By 
2008, Vodacom reported 4,448, Cell C 10,622 and MTN 6,138 ported 
numbers (Vodacom, 2008) of the estimated 46 million mobile subscriber base 
in South Africa (South Africa Telecommunication Report Q4, 2008). The 
subscriber base is not based on head count but the number of SIM cards sold 
by operators. The number in South Africa is smallin contrast to what 
happened in Hong Kong during its first month of porting where more than 
100,000 subscribers ported.  
During the first quarter of the introduction of MNP, about 867 consumers 
complained about delays in porting (Vodacom, 2008). The terms and 
conditions for porting are not clear for consumers, for instance, if a customer 
does not notify the mobile operator that they wish to discontinue their 
contract, the operator automatically locks the customer into a new contract, 
and if the customer insists on cancelling the contract, then they are made to 
pay penalties at times, regarded as claw-back, which are not regulated 
(ICASA, 2007). 
All these developments indicate that there are still problems in South Africa 
regarding MNP and hence this choice of study.  
3.2. Purpose  statement  
The study will investigate how the quality of service, porting information, 
porting times, consumer awareness, churn coverage, value added service 
and switching costs have benefitted    consumers of South Africa since the 
implementation of MNP in November 2006.   
ICASA promulgated MNP regulations 2005 as compliance with the legislative 
directive of the repealed Telecommunications Act of 1996. The purpose is to 
establish if policy and regulations achieved its intended objectives on MNP. 
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Furthermore, it is important to hear the views of mobile operators and 
subscribers on the success and weaknesses of MNP.  
3.3. Research questions 
The objectives of the Electronic Communications Act brings the costs of 
telecommunications services down, provide consumers with choice and for 
operators to provide consumers with quality service. The problem that has 
come out of the literature review is the high costs of mobile telephony and 
lack of consumer protection against market abuse. So the question on 
whether consumers have benefitted after the legal framework was put in 
place is relevant.  
Research questions are interrogative statements which the investigator seeks 
to answer (Creswell, 2003: 108). Similarly, Leedey and Omrod (2001) 
describe a research question as the heart of any research project. The 
research question can be influenced by previous literature on the subject as it 
may provide information on how certain issues emanating from the problem 
have been addressed. 
Leedy and Omrod (2001) further mention that a research question provides a 
position from which the researcher may initiate an exploration of the problem 
or sub problem and also act as a checkpoint against which to test findings of 
the data. In this study, the researcher tried to establish the following: 
Main question 
To what extent have consumers of mobile phone service in South Africa 
benefitted from MNP?  
Sub- questions 
1. How has MNP contributed to improving consumer choice in the mobile 
sector 
2. How has MNP contributed to improvements in competition in the 
mobile telephone sector? 
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3. What lessons for policy and regulation can be learned from South 
Africa’s MNP experience? 
 
3.4. Research methodology 
 
This study adopted qualitative methods. A study by Kvale (1996) has shown 
that in the qualitative study, the researcher “attempts to understand the world 
from the subjects' point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples' 
experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations” 
(Kvale 1996, p.1 - 2). The world of the interviewees is understood to be the 
environment in which consumers were exposed in regards to mobile services 
before porting, processes undertaken to port and end results of their 
decisions to port. This entails level of service by operators, prices, and 
information. 
Similarly, mobile operators had to share their experiences at the time when 
they put strategies in place – how porting contributed to subscriber gain or 
loss and among others how they have improved services after porting was 
introduced. Importantly, the interpretation of meaning was in line with policy 
and regulatory documents on MNP and its objectives which could be best 
understood with a qualitative methodology rather than a quantitative 
methodology.   
3.5. Research design 
 
Mouton (2001) provides a distinction between research design and research 
methodology, but suggests that they are interdependent. He points out that 
processes for research design can be compared to that of building a house 
and the construction itself together with the tools are regarded as research 
methodology. Research design is informed by the research problem, which 
means that data collected should address the research problem (Mouton, 
2001, p. 55-56).  
 T. Dube. Student Number: 296539  76 
 According to Leedy & Omrod (2001) there are different types of research 
designs. They are case study, ethnography, phenomenological study, 
grounded theory study and content analysis. For purposes of this study, the 
relevant research, in a form of phenomenological study will be explained and 
reasons for its adoption will be provided (Leedy & Omrod, 2001, p.139-140).  
 
3.5.1. Phenomenological  
There are various description of phenomenological methods emanating from 
various scholars. The description will be aligned to the intended study in order 
to assist the researcher with the choice and identification of the relevant 
method. Welman and Kruger (1999) describe phenomenology as follows: “the 
phenomenologists are concerned with understanding social and 
psychological phenomena from the perspectives of people involved” (Welman 
& Kruger 1999, p. 189).  
Leedy & Omrod (2001) refer to phenomenology as a person’s perception of 
meaning of an event, the methods of phenomenology involved lengthy 
interviews with carefully selected sample of between 5 – 25 individuals. The 
researcher chose 30 subscribers of MNP, mobile operators and ICASA, were 
interviewed. Subscribers are key players in the study as the purpose of the 
study is aimed at understanding their perspective with regard to the 
introduction of MNP mainly on how it had benefitted them. Leedy & Omrod 
further indicated respondents’ perceptions are the determining factor when 
applying phenomenology. Unlike other studies, the researcher deliberately 
did not sample respondents according to background or demographics, and 
also did not interview only those who are post-paid but included pre-paid as 
well. As such, the findings will determine the effects of mobile operator 
strategies in addressing quality service whilst also looking at price issues 
(Leedy & Omrod, 2001, p. 139 -140).   
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According to Denzin (1983) phenomenology is used to locate the interpretivist 
approach within a context.  further indicates that interpretive interactions 
asserts that meaningful interpretation of human experience can only come 
from those persons who have thoroughly immersed themselves in the 
phenomenon they wish to interprete and understand (Denzin, 1983). 
 A case in point is the role played by mobile operators and the public during 
consultation process on the development of MNP regulations and the 
consumer guide. The operators’ perception on whether MNP has benefitted 
consumers or not, was informed by their level of knowledge of the 
phenomenon and how MNP has impacted them as business, drawing 
inferences from the regulations and international best practices. On the other 
hand, the regulator’s perspective was similarly important on whether the 
regulatory objectives were met for consumers, whilst providing perception on 
the regulations and the role of ICASA with regard to the introduction of MNP. 
With this design, the researcher is expected to be objective and not allow pre-
conceived ideas to influence the process. The researcher is currently 
employed by ICASA, and is privileged to information on MNP processes from 
conception to completion. To ensure objectivity, a letter was written to the 
ICASA CEO to request permission to interview staff on MNP; and permission 
was granted. (See appendix 2). 
3.6. Data collection 
As indicated earlier, the method for this study is qualitative.  Babbie (2005) 
describes the qualitative field of study as an examination of attitudes and 
behaviours with respect to social processes over time. According to Clarke 
(2000) it refers to meanings of experiences, involves observation, and data 
collection in natural settings as opposed to ‘contrived’ ones and where 
incorporation of context, complexity and diversity are essential. Face to face 
method of qualitative data collection includes the use of one-on-one 
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interviews, focus groups, video/audio –tapes and photographs, archival 
material and records. It is important to mention that of all the above data 
collection methods, this study did not use focus groups interviews, 
video/audio tapes and photographs (Babbie, 2005).  
Babbie (2005) further stipulates that there are several advantages identified 
with the telephonic interview in research. They include money and time, 
convenient for other cultural groups who don’t have to look the interviewer in 
the eye, there is greater control over data collection, and there is an element 
of personal safety for the interviewer (Babbie, 2005:252- 279).  
3.6.1 Physical Location of the study 
The interview with subscribers was done telephonically throughout and their 
location was not asked. The interviews with Vodacom and ICASA were held 
at ICASA’s offices. Other operators decided to answer by email. 
3.6.2 Population Location of the study  
The study consists of subscribers from MTN, Cell C, Vodacom, Virgin Mobile 
and Nashua Mobile. Representatives of operators were chosen from 
regulatory departments. ICASA was represented by Councilor Batyi who was 
involved in the development of regulations and Mr. Gumani Malebusha a staff 
member who deals with complaints. The Department of Communications 
(DoC) was represented by the Chief Director on policy, Mr. Mlindi Kgamedi.   
Participation during interviews was balanced as it represented the 
perspectives of consumers, business, regulators and policy-makers. 
3.6.3 Documents  
Documents which were used for the analysis consisted of the repealed 
Telecommunication Act of 1996, MNP regulations of 2005, End User and 
Subscriber Charter, Handsets subsidy Regulations and Electronic 
Communications Act of 2005 as well as public submissions on MNP 
regulations.   
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3.6.4 Sample Size 
One person was interviewed from the Department of Communications (DoC), 
two people from ICASA, four people from mobile operators, and 30 
subscribers. In total, the sample size is 37. 
3.6.5 Interviews 
There were face-to-face interviews with both Vodacom and the regulator. The 
purpose of interviewing the regulator was to hear their perception on how 
consumers have benefitted from MNP. The regulator was also asked to share 
their perception on whether the regulatory objectives of MNP were met or not 
on the basis that they were responsible for the development of regulations as 
required by legislation. Operators were asked to provide their perception on 
whether consumers have benefitted from MNP or not and this was addressed 
through the strategy which they had in place in order to prepare for the 
introduction of MNP. 
With regards to the study on MNP, the researcher asked respondents if they 
understood the concept of MNP and if they will be willing to answer 
questions. It was imperative for the researcher to allow respondents to 
provide their personal comments on what they thought require change with 
regard to porting. Even though much was not said with these questions, but it 
provided them with the opportunity to voice out that opinion over and above 
the questions asked.  
Vodacom was represented by Mr. Mortimer Hope Head of Engineering, MTN,  
Nashua Mobile was represented by Mr. Dean Arthur Network Manager, Cell 
C, Mr. Harrish Kasseepursad Senior Manager: Regulatory and MTN was 
represented by Mr. Geoff Blake Senior Manager: Regulatory. ICASA was 
represented by Councilor Nomvuyiso Batyi and Mr. Gumani Malebusha from 
Consumer Affairs Division. The DoC was represented by Mr. Mlindi Chief 
Director. The advantage experienced during the telephone interviews with 
respondents was the convenient with regard to time. There were respondents 
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who indicated the preferred time slots to be called. If it happened that at that 
time they are not available, another attempt would be made until they were 
ready to speak.  
Emails 
MTN, Cell C and Nashua mobile chose to respond to questions by email, the 
reason being commitment at work. There are advantages and disadvantages 
with this form of interview. The pros are that it is convenient and cheap, but 
the cons are that questions may not be answered in full or other officers may 
be delegated to respond. This was evident with answers from all three mobile 
operators because some of the questions were not answered in other cases 
they provided short responses. 
According to Leedy & Omrod (2001) interviews in the qualitative study are not 
structured such as in the quantitative study. They are flexible and contain 
probing questions which can provide unintended responses which may be 
hard to compare and segment. The researcher had to ‘explore for meaning’. 
Bernard (1982) meaning has to be examined in order to establish if interview 
questions allowed the respondents to comment on aspects of research 
questions that they thought were important.  
The approach employed on these interviews involved semi-structured, emails 
and telephonic interviews. By their very nature, semi-structured interviews 
promote an active, open ended dialogue where respondents are free to 
interact (Babbie, 2004). 
3.6.6 Questions prepared for interviewees 
 
Questions on policy 
The researcher asked the Department of Communications if policy objectives 
on competition were achieved. The concept of MNP was firstly introduced in 
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the repealed Telecommunication Act of 1996 in order to stimulate 
competition. 
Questions on regulation 
As mentioned in the background section, the purpose of the establishment of 
regulators is to protect consumers and introduce competition. MNP was seen 
as solution to cut prices and ensure that consumers had a choice of different 
services and their preferred operators. It was therefore important to hear the 
perspective of the regulator with regard to the extent to which the regulatory 
objectives were met in regards to consumer benefit and further to indicate 
their views on the current regulations.  
Mobile operators questions on MNP  
Whilst the crux of the interviews is about consumers, operators as well play a 
vital role in the study because MNP could not be rolled out without their 
participation. It was important how they perceived of the concept of MNP in 
comparison to global mobile operators who were not keen at implementing it. 
They were asked to share their strategies put in place for the introduction of 
MNP. These strategies shed light on whether the market was ready to 
embrace MNP or not and importantly they provided their perception on 
consumer benefits.  
Subscriber questions 
The researcher developed a standard questionnaire for consumers who have 
ported which involved common sets of questions.  Questions for the 
consumers who ported were categorised into first reasons for porting, second 
benefits for porting and lastly experiences during porting.  
Mouton (2001) highlights three important factors which describe methodology 
and are: “processes, tools and procedures which a researcher utilises to 
formulate a research method” (Mouton, 2001, p.56).  
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3.7. Data request procedures 
 
3.7.1. Ethical issues 
The researcher is full time employee at ICASA, and issues of ethics had to be 
applied to avoid bias and subjectivity when addressing issues of MNP. Letters 
to all respondents clearly stipulated that the study was conducted purely for 
purposes of academic research study for master’s qualification. The same 
information was read to consumers who were selected for participation as 
written on the questionnaire.  
3.7.1.1. Permission to acquire ported numbers  
 
Firstly, permission had to be sought to acquire records of ported numbers by 
all mobile operators and service providers. In order to acquire this, a letter 
was written to the Number Portability Company (Pty) Ltd seeking permission 
to access data of ported numbers since 2006. This company is established by 
mobile operators namely MTN and Vodacom, in accordance with the MNP 
regulations who are contributing fees towards its operations and 
sustainability. The role and function of the company is to administer a Central 
Reference Database which oversees all porting processes and it is linked to 
all operators. The letter was approved by the CEO of the company Mr. Clive 
Fagan on the 28 September 2009. The researcher was given a file to make 
copies of numbers ported per year (see appendix 1).  
3.7.1.2. Permission to interview the regulator 
 
A letter was written to ICASA’s CEO on March 2010, seeking permission to 
interview ICASA’s staff on MNP. Permission was sought and the signed letter 
was provided. An email was written to Councilor Nomvuyiso Batyi of ICASA 
on 28 July 2010 requesting permission to interview her. The interview was 
done on 24 August 2010 at her office. The interview was followed by one with 
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Mr. Gumani Malebusha of complaints department on the same date in the 
afternoon.  
3.7.1.3.  Permission to interview operators.  
 
An email was sent to Vodacom 02 August 2010, to Cell C on to MTN on 25 
August 2010, 25 August 10 and seeking permission to interview. They were 
given an option of a face to face interview or to provide feedback on the 
questions sent. Vodacom opted to a face to face interview. Other operators 
opted to answer the questions by email due to time constraints on their side.  
Cell C provided answers on 28.08.10, Nashua Mobile on 7.09.2010 and MTN 
sent their response on 22.09.10 
3.8. Trustworthiness  
 
Lincoln & Cuba (1985) describe trustworthiness as: 
an imperative attribute of any qualitative study. Trustworthiness 
consists of four factors, which must be taken into consideration and 
are: credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability. 
However, In order to ensure trustworthiness, the researcher adopted 
the special strategies in phenomenology (p. 290)    
3.8.1. Intuiting  
 
“Intuiting is described as a process of thinking through the data so that a true 
comprehensive or accurate interpretation of what is meant in a particular 
description is achieved” (Streubert, Speziale & Carpenter 2003, p.54). MNP 
has a significant amount of jargon which may be confusing to a person not 
familiar with the concepts or ICT environment. In order for respondents to 
understand and provide answers, language had to be simple and friendly. 
Even though the questionnaire was prepared, the researcher used open 
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ended questions, in order to clarify and allow for more details during 
interviews.  
3.8.2. Bracketing  
 
Holloway (2005) explains: 
Bracketing refers to the process of holding assumptions and 
presuppositions in suspension to improve the rigour of the research. 
Here, the researcher explores their own assumptions and 
preconceptions in order to set them aside or keep them in suspension, 
so that they do not interfere with the information given by respondents 
(p. 289).  
On the basis of working for the regulator and having privileged information on 
MNP, the researcher had to omit her knowledge on consumer challenges 
pertaining to MNP porting, short comings of the MNP regulation and the 
conduct of operators when it comes to porting requests. According to 
Speziale & Carpenter (2003), bracketing process is important throughout the 
research process especially with regard to data analysis and requires the 
researcher to remain neutral with regard to the belief or disbelief in the 
existence of the phenomenon (Streubert et al, 2003 p.52). As such, it was 
important to ask questions objectively and listen in detail for feedback.  This 
was achieved by following all ethical processes in research.  
3.8.3. Analysing  
 
During the interviews with consumers who ported, the researcher ‘listened to, 
compare and contrast descriptions of the phenomenon under study’ (Brink & 
Wood 1998:20) being the benefits of MNP. As the researcher took notes of 
what was said, she was able to identify the recurring themes and 
interrelationship on what was said by consumers of MNP and mobile 
operators. 
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According to Seidel (1998), data analysis occurs in various forms where a 
researcher collects and code information. He refers to coding as sorting out 
information from the rest.  “the researcher sorts and sifts them, searching for 
types, classes, sequences, processes, patterns or wholes. The aim of this 
process is to assemble or reconstruct the data in a meaningful or 
comprehensible fashion” (Jorgensen, 1989, p. 107). 
Using Freidson’s (1975) approach of Doctoring Together, which refers to 
noticing and collecting, the researcher did the following: 
Noticing: 30 people were interviewed on the impact of MNP to 
consumers of South Africa. All responses were recorded and 
transcribed.  
Collecting: Data received during the interviews was then analysed and 
segmented (Freidson, 1975). 
The researcher used the inductive approach which provides thematic codes 
on the research findings. “Inductive analysis means that the patterns, themes, 
and categories of analysis come from the data; they emerge out of the data 
rather than being imposed on them prior to data collection and analysis” 
(Patton, 1980:306). The researcher indicated earlier that the qualitative 
design adopted for this study is phenomenological, which provides 
interviewees the opportunity to articulate themselves in detail whilst the 
researcher listens and ask probing questions.  
Based on the responses, the researcher analysed common information 
important feedback on reasons for porting, benefit for porting and 
experiences during porting. Tesch (1990) adds to this by saying that “the unit 
of analysis is usually segments of texts that contain some particular meaning, 
rather than individual words or phrases” (Tesch, 1990, p.728).  It is important 
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to indicate that analysis was done in a way that perceptions as outlined 
during the interview are not exaggerated or misconstrued.  
3.8.4. Describing  
 
According to Brink & Wood (1998) ‘describing is the final step and the aim is 
to communicate and describe either in writing and verbally distinct, critical 
elements of the phenomenon, thereby communicating to others what the 
researchers has found’ (Brink & Wood, 1998, p.23). In line with the study by 
Streubert et al (2003) this phenomenological study, describing involved 
classifying all critical elements essences common to the lived experience of 
being involved in the MNP study (Streubert et al, 2003, p. 61). 
3.9. Data analysis 
 
The analysis was based on strength and weaknesses of policy, regulatory, 
mobile operators and subscribers’ experiences.  During the interviews with 
respondents resulted in the formulation of themes which answer the research 
questions, but will be discussed in detail in the analysis chapter.  
3.10. Significance of the study  
 
The researcher deemed it necessary to conduct a study on the impact of 
MNP to consumers of South Africa, because there was an expectation from 
government, the regulator and consumers on the benefits it will provide. Of 
importance, were three factors captured in the legislation, namely: the 
reduction of prices, quality of service and consumer choice.  
According to Lapo (2007) the introduction of MNP was supposed to be 
determined by consumer demand. As argued by other mobile operators if 
most consumers did not want MNP, then such as service should not be 
introduced as it would be costly for operators who were required to set up a 
technology which will accommodate all numbers with different prefixes, and to 
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manage the database. Such expenditure would not be recovered if consumer 
demand was less. It was therefore important to conduct this study in order to 
investigate if operators shared same sentiments as it happened abroad when 
MNP was introduced (Lapo, 2007).  
Fundamentally, Lapo (2007) intimates that regulators were obligated to 
determine a threshold for the market size of those who will require MNP. 
Such an assertion assisted the researcher in determining whether ICASA 
conducted such a study prior the implementation of MNP as this would be a 
yard stick among others, to determine if South Africa was ready for MNP.  
However, ICASA did not conduct any study before the introduction of MNP, 
but did that post implementation (Lapo, 2007).   
3.11. Limitations of the study  
 
It is imperative for the researcher to highlight limitations of the study as they 
may have an impact on the research conclusion. This study takes place five 
years after the implementation of MNP. Research findings may not be 
reliable, due to the fact that respondents could not recall clearly if they were 
charged for porting or if charged how much they were required to pay.  
The researcher grappled with the idea of having a focus group study which 
would be manageable and easy to conduct but due to limited financial 
resources, opted for telephone interviews. The respondents, through 
telephone interviews could have provided answers without applying their 
mind on what was asked as they could have just wanted to end the interview.  
The researcher deemed it necessary not to segment the participant according 
to demographics, gender, rural or urban, big business and SMMEs as it was 
done by Goldstuck (2006).  The reason for not following this approach was 
based on the MNP legislative objectives, which stipulated general benefits 
despite the mentioned attributes. This study further focused only on the 
benefits of those who have ported their numbers, unlike Lyons whose study 
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looks at the three types of benefits for consumers which are (1) benefits 
obtained by customers who switch (2) benefits by all mobile telephony users 
and (3) benefits obtained by those calling to ported numbers. The exclusion 
of the other groups, particularly benefit (3) may provide limited findings to the 
study. 
3.12. Addressing the limitations of the study  
 
The researcher has asked probing questions which will elicit more substantial 
responses. The interviews were held with 30 subscribers who have ported 
and all representing different mobile operators.  The research findings will 
provide an opportunity for future studies on why a lot of consumers are not 
porting and categories which have been left out in the study could be included 
in order to arrive at a different conclusion.   
3.13. Conclusion 
This chapter described the research problem, research questions, research 
purpose, methodology, ethical issues, and trustworthiness of the study, 
significance of the study as well as limitations of the study. The study as 
indicated, investigates the extent to which consumers that have ported 
benefitted. Data for subscribers was acquired from the Number Portability 
Company. Mobile Operators, regulator and policy makers are also part of the 
sample study. The interviews were held face to face, through telephone and 
email. The next chapter introduces the findings from all respondents.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON THE IMPACT OF MNP ON 
CONSUMERS OF SA 
4. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides research findings with regard to the questions asked on 
the effects of MNP on consumers. The following mixture of interviews was 
conducted: face to face interviews, telephone interviews and email. The 
Department of Communications responded by email, Nashua Mobile, MTN 
and Cell C also responded by email. Telephone interviews were conducted 
with all subscribers who ported from MTN, Vodacom, Cell C, Virgin Mobile, 
and Nashua Mobile. Face to face Interviews were held with Vodacom and the 
regulator. This chapter is categorised into four sections: policy, regulatory, 
mobile operator’s perspective, and subscribers experience and perspective.  
Whilst all findings in the research are important, the perspective by operators 
was vital, because it shed light on the readiness of the country with regard to 
introduction of MNP.  Ideally, when policy directive is issued and regulations 
are in place, the action taken by operators determines the successes or 
failure of the directive. The operators indicated the strategies they have 
adopted in order to prepare for MNP and include: information, technology, 
cheaper prices, competition, consumer choice and quality of service. They 
further highlighted the effects of MNP with regard to their subscriber base and 
also provided their perspective on the current MNP regulations. The findings 
for both the operators and subscribers drew a disjuncture on the 
interpretation of benefits of MNP, and these differences will be analysed in 
detail in the next chapter. 
The findings from subscribers are presented in three categories: reasons for 
porting, benefits of porting and experiences during porting. Out of these 
categories there are sub categories namely: quality of service, phone 
packages, value added services, pricing rates and company brands.  
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4.1. Policy perspective  
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, MNP was instrumental in stimulating 
competition in the telecommunications sector. Competition has various 
attributes and it includes provision of quality of service, low prices and new 
entrants to level the playing field. South Africa was still regarded as a 
‘duopoly’ market due to the dominance of two operators; MTN and Vodacom. 
An interview was held with the Department of Communications (DoC) with 
regard to the policy objectives of introducing MNP in South Africa. As 
indicated by Kgamedi (2010),   Chief Director at the DoC, the objective of 
introducing MNP was to allow mobile phone subscribers to keep the same 
number when they change networks in a bid to force providers to improve 
services.  He said that much is to be done with regard to the promotion of 
competition by the regulator especially on pricing.  Kgamedi (2010) said: 
There is price collusion among operators and as such it cannot be 
concluded that MNP contributed to a competitive market. The 
Regulator has to undertake processes in terms of Chapter 10 of the 
ECA to ensure that any subsequent regulations thereafter to enforce 
MNP are backed by facts. He further said that from the policy’s point of 
view, MNP has not achieved its intended objectives.  
The same views on lack of competition were shared by the regulator. In an 
interview Councilor Batyi, she said that there was doubt that MNP promoted 
competition among operators. A case in point is multiple SIM cards by 
subscribers, especially pre-paid users. Basically, pre-paid users are not keen 
to port but would rather buy multiple SIM-cards from different operators as 
they are cheap.  
The only problem in respect to the readiness of introducing MNP lies 
with mobile operators such as MTN and Vodacom, distributors and 
service providers such as Nashua Mobile. They feared that MNP will 
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destabilise their subscriber base and their clients would be taken by 
other operators. “No one wants to lose their clients, every business 
wants to keep them” (Batyi, 2010). 
Batyi said that whilst the regulator was ready, operators were playing 
delaying tactics with regard to the implementation of MNP. She indicated that 
operators complained that the regulator was unfair because it did not follow 
the global trends when introducing MNP. What happened in other countries 
was that Geographic Number Portability (GNP) preceded MNP. However, the 
situation in South Africa was different because at the time when the 
Telecommunication Act of 1996 introduced the concept of Number Portability, 
the second network operator was not licensed yet.  
Furthermore, the Telecommunications Act as repealed was clear on the time 
frames and the expectation for the Authority to ensure that NP was 
introduced. ICASA informed Operators that MNP will continue as planned 
because of the high intake of telephony usage in the mobile industry and 
therefore South Africa could not follow-suit with global trends on what came 
first: GNP or MNP. Moreover Telkom was still a fixed-line monopoly. The 
target date of November 2005 was met (Batyi, 2010).  
According to MTN the introduction of the Electronic Communications Act 
(ECA) led to convergence of licenses whereby the old Value Added Network 
Services (VANS) were given licenses for electronic communications network 
services (ECNS) and electronic communications service (ECS). “Competition 
was partially achieved and this is indicative of the fact that competition on a 
smaller level however, came about from the licensing of over 400 operators” 
(Blake, 2010).  
Contrary to MTN, Vodacom and Cell C had a different view about 
competition. The two operators said that the introduction of MNP did not open 
the market to competition. “The fact is that there are only three mobile 
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network operators that did not improve competition because they all have 
similar product offerings and there is no price differentiation” (Hope, 2010).   
Cell C mentioned that to a certain extent, the policy objectives were met 
however due to lack of transparency on the on-net price and off-net 
subscribers belonging to other mobile operators have hesitated to switch. Cell 
C said that the low porting since the inception of MNP was evidence that 
consumers were still skeptical about MNP, and this happened because of 
lack of price transparency.  
4.2. Conclusion on policy perspective 
 
The aim of the introduction of competition was ensure that consumers are 
protected against the high costs of telecommunications and poor service. 
Importantly competition was necessary for consumers to exercise   their right 
to choice. The DoC is of the view that MNP did not benefit consumers and 
wants the regulator to amend the regulations in order to address pricing 
issues. The convergence of former VANS licenses did not stimulate 
competition as far as end user is concerned because none of these licensees 
ventured into mobile telephony. Most pre-paid users exacerbated the problem 
because instead of porting, they prefer acquisition of multiple SIM-cards, 
therefore leaving the majority of ports to post-paid subscribers.   
4.3. Regulatory perspective   
  
The introduction of MNP is premised on three regulatory objectives namely: 
consumer choice, improved quality of service and low prices for consumers. 
Importantly, both the regulator and operators are required by MNP 
regulations to conduct consumer education campaigns for consumers to 
make sound decision with regard to porting, which means, in the absence of 
adequate education campaigns, consumers may be ignorant of benefits of 
MNP and operators may leverage on ignorance to increase prices. In this 
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section, the researcher provides findings on how operators implemented the 
regulatory objectives with regard to MNP.  
4.3.1. Consumer choice  
The researcher wanted to establish if it was easy for consumers to switch 
operators as stipulated in the MNP regulations. Basically, if a subscriber has 
complied with his or her contract obligations and wants to port, the donor 
operator should make a request to the recipient operator. 
 In terms of opening up competition, MNP regulations permit operators to 
work with service providers, basically allowing them to compete for the same 
market. This happens only if operators sign a memorandum of understanding 
with service providers in order for them to comply with the requirements 
stipulated in the regulations. Service providers are not issued with licenses on 
electronic communication services (ECS) or electronic communications 
network services (ECNS) by ICASA, but do provide similar services with 
mobile operators such as airtime, post-paid and prepaid packages. This 
agreement led to more options for consumers with regard to choice (Arthur, 
2010). Consumer choice is associated with operators’ service and product 
offerings. Arthur (2010) argued: 
To be able to move networks and SP’s and maintain your number is 
the best option to have especially for corporate consumers. A 
consumer is now not obligated to any specific network as he or she 
now owns their number and not the service provider. This approach by 
service providers and network operators was used to retain clients 
previously and consumers hardly had a choice and found themselves 
staying for poor service just to maintain the number. 
However, there is a regulatory weakness identified: namely, the switching 
barrier hinders consumers from porting. The switching barrier refers to the 
difficulty of switching to another provider by a consumer and this occurs in a 
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form of penalty charges. Penalty charges occur when an operator charges a 
subscriber a terminating charge. These charges are not regulated so they are 
open to abuse by operators. According to Hope (2010): 
The fact that consumers are still expected to pay penalty 
charges which are not regulated makes it difficult for 
consumers to port. For consumers, MNP is more of a hassle 
than a benefit.  ICASA has to do more to protect contract 
subscribers with regard to the unfair strategies by other 
operators and service providers for lock- in.  
Vodacom said that operators such as MTN were using the ‘clawback’ as a 
strategy to retain consumers. When consumers port their numbers they are 
required to adhere to the terms and conditions. But the same regulation does 
not stipulate how operators should conduct themselves when it comes to 
charges for contracts. Vodacom further indicated that unlike MTN and its 
service providers, they calculate what consumers are supposed to pay on the 
remaining contract plus subscription fee, whilst MTN could charge consumers 
an amount equivalent to a person taking a contract for the first time. This 
results to consumer lock in and results in both the consumer and the recipient 
operator being frustrated (Hope, 2010).  
MTN views choice in two different ways. Choice in connection with quality of 
service, and choice as a result of churn rate. Firstly, the view is that if an end 
user perceives that the quality of service of one operator is better than 
another, he or she will terminate his or her contract in order to join a new 
network operator. This happens more with post paid subscribers.  
An interesting antidote on this is in the UK, subscribers were asked to 
rate the quality of service of operators in that country, Virgin Mobile 
was ranked highest in quality of service, British Telecom(BT) was 
ranked the lowest. Here’s the kicker, Virgin is a virtual operator 
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roaming on BT at the time. So it is very much a perceived impression 
(Blake, 2010).  
Secondly, even though choice is regulated and exercised by consumers, 
there is a down side. A large number of subscriber base in South Africa 
consists of pre-paid market. MNP has not attracted a lot of pre-paid 
subscribers because they are able to acquire multiple SIM-cards from any 
operators of their choice without any limit, thus creating churn. Although 
churn rate has decreased because of the introduction of the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications – Related Information Act of 2009 (RICA), 
MNP requests are still low. RICA requires subscribers to register SIM cards 
by producing identification number and a proof of residence. Government is 
doing this in order to manage security risks (Blake, 2010). 
In an interview with ICASA, Councilor Batyi indicated that consumer choice 
was about the power of a consumer to keep their number, and about 
competition between service providers and operators. Her view is that people 
were initially trapped with a service provider they did not like because they 
were afraid to lose their numbers, thus making MNP a necessity and a 
consumer benefit. 
4.3.2. Quality of service  
 
According to Malebusha of ICASA, between 2007 and 2010, 18 complaints 
were received against Cell C, eight against Vodacom, 20 against MTN, 1 
against Nashua Mobile and 1 against Virgin Mobile. He mentioned that 
complaints ranged from billing and refusal by operators to port numbers. With 
regard to billing, consumers complain about ‘clawback’ charges where they 
are expected to pay huge amount of money when they terminate their 
contracts. There were instances where a consumer was expected to pay 
between R3000, 00 – R5000, 00 for termination of a contract with only two 
days left. This occurred mainly with service providers. “These service 
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providers forced consumers to sign forms indicating that they will lose their 
numbers when they want to port” (Malebusha, 2010). 
He identified a weakness in the MNP regulations and indicated that the lack 
of a penalty clause for non-compliance makes it harder for the regulator to 
enforce the regulations. He said that this grey area within the regulations 
made ICASA powerless as it could not enforce its authority to the operators. 
He said that ICASA does intervene when there are complaints, but 
consumers are not entirely protected in this regard (Malebusha, 2010).  
When asked if ICASA had monitoring system in place for MNP compliance, 
Malebusha indicated that ICASA does monitor compliance. “Monitoring could 
be looked at in two ways: firstly, regulations are used as a yard stick to 
ensure compliance. Secondly, the reports which are submitted by licensees to 
the authority are also a measurement” (Malebusha, 2010). However, he 
admitted that the regulator was not currently able to verify information 
provided by licensees.  
According to Vodacom, quality of service can be viewed as follows:  first, it 
occurs when operators improve technology on a regular basis, in order to 
ensure seamless service. This includes the extent to which phone 
conversations are not interrupted, less calls are dropped, the quality of 
network coverage increases, and the availability of network coverage 
increases in certain areas (Hope, 2010).  
Second is customer satisfaction. Customers here expect reasonable 
turnaround times by operators when resolving their complaints, and are 
interested at the speed in which phones are answered, as well as the level of 
knowledge by customer care consultants.  In order to ensure that quality of 
service is provided, the regulator implemented the End User and Service 
Charter regulations. The regulations give measures which should be adhered 
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to by operators. The disadvantage with these regulations was firstly, that they 
came almost four years after the implementation of MNP (Hope, 2010).  
Vodacom went further by conducting a feasibility study “We have sourced out 
the services of Customer Delight Index, external consultants who made a 
research study about our services. And the results were that Vodacom, in 
comparison to other operators was providing good service” (Hope, 2010). Cell 
C said that a ported subscriber is treated the same as a normal subscriber in 
ensuring that quality of service parameters is maintained and in line with 
these regulations (Kasseepursad, 2010).  
4.3.3. Cheaper prices 
 
The introduction of MNP created an expectation that MNP will bring down 
prices of mobile telephony. Prices of mobile services are reported be high in 
South Africa more than those of developed countries. Based on the findings, 
it is clear that MNP did not contribute to the reduction of prices. Seemingly, 
post paid subscribers still pay high prices because of monthly subscription fee 
plus usage, insurance and handsets as post-paid contracts are bundled with 
handsets. Batyi intimated there were countries that were successful in making 
it an obligation for mobile operators to unbundle services. This was a different 
case in South Africa because since 2004, the authority has failed to finalise 
the hands- set subsidy regulations due to reluctance and legal threats by the 
industry. She said that the authority was yet to pronounce its decision on the 
future of the draft regulations (Batyi, 2010). 
Councillor Nomvuyiso Batyi indicated that although prices have not gone 
down as anticipated, consumers were not taking advantage of packages 
which save their money no matter how small.  She said that consumers in 
most cases could not determine price differentiation among mobile operators 
because they were reluctant to familiarise themselves with the contract terms 
and condition.  
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Consumers should know that when all family members for instance are 
using different network operator which is known as off-net calls, they 
will pay more but should they decide to belong to one network operator 
regarded as on- net calls, they can save some money. Understanding 
the packages such as talk 100, or 500 for instance can make a 
difference and furthermore, they should have the discipline to read 
their billing statements (Batyi, 2010).  
Batyi also mentioned that ICASA had not exercised its powers to regulate 
interconnection fees for a long time because of challenges in finalising the 
market study which aims to identify significant market players. ‘An 
interconnection fee is the flat rate mobile operators charge to connect a caller 
from one operator's network to another. They charged each other R1.25, 
which was then transferred to consumers’ (Batyi, 2010). She said that 
operators continue to charge high costs as tariff rates are self-regulated. 
Currently there is no regulation on tariffs for communications operators, 
however, all tariff applications are sent to the regulator for information and 
records. Chapter 10 section 7 (f –h) talks about cost accounting and price 
mechanisms which should be implemented by operators (Batyi, 2010).  
The researcher asked Councilor Batyi if the regulator had conducted an ex 
ante study, which essentially assesses the attitude of consumers before the 
implementation of MNP, she responded by saying that the regulator was not 
required by law to conduct a study on MNP prior to its implementation. She 
indicated that ICASA commissioned BMI-T Company to conduct ex post 
study in 2009, in order to assess the impact of MNP.  The findings among 
others included more awareness programmes as many people were still not 
familiar with MNP. Furthermore, whilst benefits of MNP could not be 
quantified most of the respondents indicated that MNP should be always 
available for those who need it.  
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According to Vodacom, operators have introduced a call-limit facility for post-
paid subscribers in order to control usage, but this facility’s effectiveness is 
not guaranteed.  This facility basically warns subscribers when they have 
reached their monthly limit, and subsequently, all outgoing calls are blocked, 
but a subscriber receives incoming calls. It is important to note that charges 
per minute for post-paid users are cheaper than that of a pre-paid subscriber. 
However, the difference is not that much because generally, charges by 
operators are determined by the market (Hope, 2010).  
MTN, Nashua Mobile and Cell C also acknowledged that pre-paid subscribers 
control their usage with guarantees because of the amount they spent on 
airtime. They further said that MNP did not reduce mobile prices. 
Cell (2010) said: 
We had no option but to offer products that were cheaper than our 
competitors in order to attract new subscribers. This in turn had the 
competitors matching these services and products. Therefore the ultimate 
goal of cheaper prices with the same level of quality was accomplished. 
 4.4. Demand for MNP 
 
As highlighted in the review of literature, demand on MNP is associated with 
its success. Moreover, MNP facility is regarded as ideal in countries with 
viable economy and competition. The researcher examined the ported 
numbers across all mobile operators in order to determine the level of 
consumer demand for portability.  The analysis of this data will determine if 
South Africa was ready for MNP. As indicated previously, the mobile 
subscriber base in South Africa is 40 million (Vodacom, 2008). The 
expectation was to have over a million ports after 2 years. However, 
according to the data received from the Number Portability Company (Pty) 
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Ltd, all ports across mobile operators from 2006 to 2008 were far less than 
what the researcher expected. 
Mobile Number Portability (2009) reported as follows: 
• 2006 – Vodacom received 6, 189 ports, Cell C got 7, 568 and MTN 
received     5,648. In total there were 19, 385 successful ports. 47, 
543 failed. 
• 2007 – Vodacom received 52, 839 ports, Cell C got 64, 316 and 
MTN received 40, 929.  In total there were 158,084 successful 
ports and 281,474 failed. 
• 2008 – Vodacom received 55, 372 ports, Cell C 54, 953 and MTN 
50, 176.  
In total of 160, 501 ports were successful and 197, 838 failed. Despite the 
estimated subscriber base of 50 million mobile services in South Africa, the 
reports show that MNP has not attracted attention, as policy anticipated.  The 
table below highlights subscriber base among the three major mobile 
operators in South Africa from 2000 – 2008. Whilst Cell C claim to have had 
attracted more subscribers after the introduction of MNP, the table shows that 
Cell C continue to be the ‘weakest link’ in mobile telephone services and 
seemingly making the impact of MNP ambiguous. 
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Figure 3: Mobile operator’s subscriber base from 2000-2008 
 
Source: BMI-T: 2009 
The subscriber base of mobile market is estimated at 40 million. The total 
number of ported numbers in the first three years is far lower than the 102 
000 MNP applications in Hong Kong during the first month of MNP. Hong 
Kong had four mobile operators with a difference of one operator in 
comparison to South Africa. In Italy, two years after the implementation of 
MNP, only 3, 68% of subscribers had ported in a mobile market of 95%. In 
Finland, over a million numbers were ported.   
Most of the countries as outlined in the literature review, had conducted a 
preliminary demand-side study in order to determine the readiness of 
countries regarding MNP. According to a study conducted by Lyons, 
countries such as UK in 1997, Hong Kong in 1998 and Ireland in 2000 
conducted ex ante studies. Nashua Mobile in South Africa conducted their 
study in 2006. ICASA did not do any study as the legislation did not require 
them to do so but decided to conduct ex-post on the impact of MNP in 2009.  
In Councilor Batyi’s opinion, MNP should be seen as a fundamental tool 
which can be accessed by consumers when they feel like using it. So it is 
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natural that demand for MNP could not be as high as anticipated because it 
remains a consumer’s prerogative to port.  She said that low porting in South 
Africa should not be seen as regulatory or market failure, but a regulatory 
achievement in ensuring consumer protection through freedom to choose.  
Batyi said that most prepaid subscribers were not willing to port because they 
had a freedom to simultaneously possess more than one SIM-card so 
basically porting was not of importance. Nonetheless the development of 
regulations and its implementation were not determined by whether there was 
a demand or not, but it was a matter of compliance with the legislative 
mandate which started with the repealed Telecommunications Act 1996. Batyi 
mentioned that ICASA intended to review the regulations in the next financial 
year. 
4.5. Summary on regulatory perspective 
 
The MNP regulations were promulgated in 2005 and operators were 
expected to implement them at the same time, but that only took place a year 
later. The implementation essentially was expected to provide choice, lower 
prices and quality of services. Seemingly this has not been achieved because 
of homogenous price and products offerings. Another down side on MNP is 
that pre-paid subscribers are not in favour, but purchase multiple SIM-cards. 
The regulator has not effectively monitor compliance as there are 
enforcement gaps with the regulations. DoC as the policy maker has made a 
determination on interconnection price cuts, in order to protect consumers 
against high costs of telecommunication in South Africa.  
4.6. Mobile operator’s perspective   
 
A mixture of interviews was held with mobile operators. MTN, Cell C, and 
Nashua Mobile responded to the questions via email and Vodacom opted for 
face to-face-interview. The interviews were meant to investigate the 
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perceptions of operators with regard to the consumer benefits.  Areas of 
enquiry related to first, mechanisms they put in place to ensure that porting 
processes took place without any unreasonable challenges; second, product 
offerings which enabled them to retain their old subscribers whilst striving to 
attract new ones; and third, the effectiveness of the legislation in ensuring 
that consumers benefit and lastly, the level of awareness among consumers 
on MNP in order to make informed decisions when they port. 
The researcher expected to hear how mobile call charges were reduced and 
how their services have improved. Operators were expected to indicate if they 
were effectively compliant with the MNP regulations, and if not to explain 
reasons.  
Figure 4: Representatives of mobile operators who participated in the 
interviews 
Operator Representative Position Date 
Vodacom Mortimer Hope Head of Department: 
Engineering 
20.06.2010 
Nashua Mobile Dean Arthur  Network Manager 09.07.2010 
Cell C Harrish Kasseepursad Senior Manager: 
Regulatory 
19.08.2010 
MTN Geoff Blake Senior Manager: 
Regulatory 
22.09.2010 
Source:  Author, 2010 
4.6.1. Strategies implemented by operators for the introduction of 
MNP. 
Strategies could be described as plans and processes which operators put in 
place in order to compete for subscriber base.  The MNP regulations clearly 
stipulate that all mobile operators will contribute towards a common standard 
technology which will be used for porting. The technology, known as the 
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Central Database system is managed and controlled by the Number 
Portability Company. The researcher wanted to investigate other competing 
strategies put in place by operators in order to prepare for MNP. Investigation 
of those strategies would help shed light on if operators are only interested in 
profit making or would come up with plans which will also benefit consumers.   
Strategies operators implemented for the introduction of MNP include 
information sharing, technology upgrade, customer education, training, and 
quality of service. Each of these is described in detail below. 
 Information sharing 
 
When asked about the strategies Vodacom put in place to prepare for the 
introduction of MNP, Vodacom indicated that they deemed it necessary to 
firstly invite a representative of Vodafone from Ireland, to come and share 
their experiences on porting, mainly from the operator’ s point of view. This 
request was done prior the implementation of MNP in South Africa in 2006.  
Out of the Vodafone presentation, Vodacom learnt that MNP was viewed in 
two ways. Firstly, MNP could be a threat for operators. Basically, operators 
did not see MNP as a benefit but rather a phenomenon which would lead to 
loss of capital. Furthermore, this notion was exacerbated by the global 
experience on porting delays, which was frustrating to both operators and 
consumers.  Delays could lead to cancellation or less demand for porting and 
if that had to happen, operators would lose capital invested in the technology, 
which is a regulatory requirement for MNP. The second view was the 
opportunity which could maximise capital for operators. Vodacom decided to 
go with the latter and put a system in place in order to ensure seamless 
porting processes. Vodacom said that during the MNP consultation processes 
with ICASA, it was clear that MTN perceived MNP as a threat because they 
were not cooperative and wanted MNP to be done away with (Hope, 2010).  
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According to Arthur (2010), the information shared by Nashua Mobile and its 
stakeholders had to do with processes which they would adopt during porting 
and not necessarily on experiences. “This was quite a task as many parties 
had to be involved for one number or customer including, New SP, Old SP, 
New Network, Old network and the CRDB. We had to ensure that our 
processes were worked in line with the industry” (Arthur, 2010). 
Technology 
 
As mentioned previously, MNP requires a new specialised technology to 
function effectively.  This technology is supposed to be compatible to all 
numbers regardless of the operator. Ideally, a mobile three digit identification 
is no longer a determining factor as those digits could be serviced though any 
operator.  
According to Vodacom, operators spent R80 million to upgrade infrastructure 
for MNP, but only a few portings are taking place. “Basically, the upgrade was 
meant to read all numbers because initially, numbers per operator could only 
be read and identified by a certain prefix, for instance 082 for Vodacom, 083 
for MTN and 084 for Cell C” (Hope, 2010). With MNP, this means that the 
new infrastructure should be able to read all the numbers despite the prefix. 
This includes numbers from fixed-line operator, as the industry anticipated 
porting between mobile and fixed-line telephony in the long term operators 
had to explain technical systems in place for MNP. 
According to Cell C, the company’s technical team ensured that its technical 
systems as well as the number porting company equipment were functioning 
optimally prior to the introduction of MNP. In order for all systems to be tested 
and verified for efficiency, they had to make a request to ICASA to delay the 
implementation date. Cell C systems were upgraded in line with an order 
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system specification (prepared by the three mobile operators) as well as the 
functional specifications as published by ICASA.  
Trials amongst all stakeholders were conducted three months before initial 
date of implementation (Kasseepursad, 2010). 
MTN indicated that that the introduction of MNP was a regulatory obligation, 
and they had no choice but to oblige.  According to MTN, all mobile operators 
met and as an industry and discussed the best strategy for implementing 
MNP. MTN explained that various models exist in SA, and they decided on 
the Signaling Relay Function (SRF) model utilizing a Central Reference 
Database (CRDB). “Although, this is more complicated and costly to set-up, 
the long term operational costs are lower” (Blake, 2010). 
According to Arthur (2010), Nashua Mobile had to invest time and money into 
buying new equipment in order for MNP to be a success.  
As simple as this may sound, we had to ensure that our systems 
worked in sync with all messages to and from the CRDB. We went one 
step further, and instead of making quick fixes for the new product we 
followed through automating as much processes as possible. This 
proved to be a huge success. A specific team of specialists were 
pulled from all departments to ensure that all aspects regarding MNP 
were covered (Arthur, 2010).    
Operator’s subscriber gain and loss 
 
MNP is viewed as an element which increases competition. For a long time, 
discussions by consumer groups, media and politicians, raised concerns that 
despite South Africa having a duopoly market in the mobile industry, 
competition did not exist. The penalty clauses for those wishing to switch and 
consumers having to give up their number among others had a negative 
impact for new entrants such as Cell C because it was difficult for them to 
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gain more subscribers. It was important for the researcher to examine the 
impact of MNP for operators. 
Vodacom indicated that it lost about 20 000 subscribers out of 600 000 
subscriber base of MNP. Hope (2010) further provided experiences on 
subscriber gain and loss as it impacted on other operators:  
Since 2006 we have ported in subscribers, and ported out 
subscribers. When looking at the numbers MTN is a net loser in 
terms of MNP, this is not unexpected as Cell C was the newest 
operator, and by consequence had the least amount of 
subscribers. They are the only net gainers to date on MNP. This 
is in line with other countries experience with MNP. Cell C 
gained 120 000 and MTN lost 100 000 subscribers. Vodacom 
lost more private subscriber on contracts and the contributing 
factor was better deals on handsets.  
This view was shared by MTN as they have acknowledged that MTN lost a 
number of subscribers at the beginning of MNP. 
Nashua Mobile said that it has lost and gained subscribers.  
We are proud to say that although we have lost many customers to our 
competitors we still remain on a positive trend. Our competitors offer 
discounts to our clients that we cannot match being a service provider 
(SP) If we do we would be losing revenue” (Arthur, 2010). Nashua 
Mobile said that though they lost clients at the beginning, they have 
established that many of those clients are coming back because of the 
service that they receive (Arthur, 2010). 
According to Kasseepursad (2010), until now, Cell C has been a net gainer. 
“This can be attributed to many reasons, robust public awareness campaigns, 
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new and innovative products and improved front-end relationship with the 
subscriber” (Kasseepursad, 2010). 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
The success of the implementation of MNP by operators was dependent on 
the strategies they put in place. Of note, was the information sharing with 
experts internationally who provided workable strategies regarding MNP. In 
order to attract new subscribers and retain old ones, operators had to ensure 
that their technology was upgraded in order to provide seamless service. 
Moreover, operators had to comply with the regulatory requirement to develop 
a central database. During the MNP consultation processes, all operators 
agreed on a standard technology, a Central Reference Database (CRDB) for 
MNP processes whilst simultaneously competing against each other. A 
different technology was used prior to the introduction of MNP – this 
technology could read numbers allocated to each operator. In the new era of 
MNP, the technology used had to be able to read all mobile numbers not only 
the first digits as they are no longer a means of reference for a mobile 
operator.  
None of the operators acknowledged that MNP has brought costs of mobile 
calls down. However they are all of the view that their customer service has 
improved. In terms of penalty charges for those who want to port, the 
operators indicated that they are using different methods because charges 
are not regulated. All indicated that ICASA needs to review the current MNP 
regulations because of the converged licensing environment, which was not 
in place at the time when MNP was implemented. 
4.8. Subscriber experiences and perspective  
 
The success of MNP as described in the policy and literature review is 
informed by these important factors for success include: quality of service, 
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low prices and choice. Furthermore, is the importance of public awareness 
and reasonable time frames required for porting. The interviews with 
subscribers were meant to solicit information regarding their experiences in 
connection with MNP.  
Figure 5: Number of ported numbers from 2007-2008 
Donor operator Number of 
ported per 
donor operator 
Recipient 
Operator 
Date of 
porting  
Vodacom  4 MTN 2007 
 5 Cell C 2008 
MTN 5 Vodacom  2007 
 3 Nashua Mobile 2008 
 4 Cell C 2008 
Cell C 3 Vodacom 2008 
 2 Virgin Mobile 2008 
 4 MTN 2008 
Source: Author, 2010 
4.8.1. Reasons for porting 
 
Five possible reasons for porting were explored: quality of service, phone 
packages, value added services, pricing, and brand appeal.  
Quality of service  
 
For the majority of respondents, network coverage was the most problematic 
element which compelled consumers to port. This problem cuts across all 
mobile operators. Respondents complained about poor reception where their 
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voices are cracking during telephone conversations and had to move around 
for a better position. Others said that there were certain areas where a phone 
call will drop and they had to make a new call. One of the respondents 
indicated that MTN network coverage was the main reason for her to port to 
Cell C. However, after porting, she found that Cell C’s network was as poor 
as that of MTN. One participant put it as follows: “There is nothing frustrating 
like having to tolerate a bad service on daily basis. I actually saw an 
advertisement on TV about MNP and was glad to hear that I can port and 
keep my number” (Participant 6, 2010).   
Phone packages 
 
Respondents indicated that contract packages are bundled with handsets. 
This means that if a subscriber’s contract was about to expire, and he or she 
wanted to renew a contract with a particular phone, they could not do that if 
that particular mobile operator did not have it. They had to terminate their 
contract in order to join another operator only for a handset or phone 
package.  “Cell C had a phone on special which I had been looking for and 
Vodacom did not have it at that time. My contract was coming to an end and I 
decided not to renew. Vodacom had a good customer care service though 
and had it been not of the phone, I wouldn’t have left” (Participant 14, 2010). 
Some of the feedback from respondents indicated that their understanding of 
phone package is more with reference to the handset that than the type of 
package they preferred. This was clear with the response from this 
participant: “Vodacom could not provide me with a specific phone I wanted. 
So I decided to port to MTN. Now that I have my phone, I want to go back to 
Vodacom” (Participant 26, 2010).  
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Value added services 
 
A small number of the participant indicated that they had ported because of 
the value added services which were not applicable with their operators. “Cell 
C could not provide me with other services such as wasp and Mix-it, and I 
decided to port to Vodacom” (Participant 23, 2010). “I did not have problems 
with Vodacom. Virgin Mobile was offering free SMSs at the time and decided 
to port to them” (Participant 20, 2010). 
In line with global trends with regards to competition, mobile operators 
introduced bundled services which included voice, data and video in one 
service.  In South Africa, Vodacom and MTN were the first operators to adopt 
these services. Cell C, according to the feedback from respondents did not 
have bundled services, which prompted those who required them to switch 
their number. 
Pricing  
 
A few respondents indicated that they switched their number because of high 
rates. “When Virgin Mobile was introduced, I had high expectation that they 
will lower their call rates” (Participant 24, 2010). A small number of 
respondents indicated that they ported in order to join their families who were 
with a particular operator and save costs using on-net calls. 
Brand appeal  
 
A small number of participant indicated that they switched because they were 
attracted by Cell C and Virgin brands. They had seen their adverts many 
times on TV and were under the impression that these two operators will 
bring about cheaper prices since they were new at the time. “Virgin was fairly 
new and it just seemed more appealing”. 
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it was clear that several respondents were attracted branding, they further 
anticipated to gain through cheaper prices as Virgin Mobile and Cell C came 
late after the licensing of MTN and Vodacom.  Though new service providers 
were new, prices did not change.  
4.8.2. Benefits of porting 
In this category the researcher anticipated to hear how respondents have 
benefited from MNP, citing in detail specific benefits emanating from the 
porting. However, respondents did not introduce new factors to describe 
benefits from switching. Instead, what was cited as reasons for porting was 
identified as a benefit after joining new operators.  They expressed joy at no 
longer having poor reception and drop calls. A few respondents indicated that 
they were saving money through offers they received from Cell C and Virgin 
Mobile such as free weekend calls and free SMSs.  They were unable to 
elaborate how much they were saving in comparison to their previous network 
operators. They did not know how much they were paying per minute, nor 
could they distinguish rates between off and on- peak as well as rates for on 
– net and off net calls. One participant said that joining her family in a similar 
network saved her money because all calls were now on-net.   
There were different views among respondents about the benefits of network 
coverage. Some respondents said that coverage has improved since porting 
but others indicated that their reason for porting did not bear positive results 
because they have realized that poor coverage cuts across all operators. 
They were disappointed that they did receive any benefit from porting.  
Respondents explained that since porting, customer care with new operators 
was far better that their old operators. Those who said that they had benefited 
by acquiring the new preferred handset mentioned that they were willing to 
port back to their previous operators. They further said that they were happy 
with other options on their phones such as availability of data and video.  
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4.8.3. Experiences during porting 
 
Both the regulator and operators developed a consumer guide document 
which clearly stipulates the processes which should be followed by operators 
and consumers when there is a request to port. In order to avoid delays or 
rejection, the consumer guide prescribed steps which should be followed by 
both pre-paid and post paid subscribers. For instance, a subscriber who 
wants to port should inform the receiving operator about his or her intention, 
and the recipient operator would make a request on behalf of the subscriber. 
The MNP regulations also stipulate that porting should take a day, and if 
there are technical problems which may make it impossible to meet this 
deadline, the donor operator should inform the recipient operator, who will 
then notify the consumer.   
Porting for the majority of respondents took place between one to two days 
during which they could not make or receive calls. “It took me a day or two to 
port my number. At that time, I could not make or receive calls. MTN has 
been a nightmare. Their service is terrible. They had given me a faulty 
handset and also kept disconnecting my number. I had to pay extra amount 
to be switched on. I don’t like MTN’ service and cannot wait to go back to 
Vodacom” (respondent 26, 2010).  
Only a small number of respondents mentioned delays of about a week and 
two weeks.  They indicated that the time frame for SIM-card activation should 
be expedited. 
Others indicated that they had lodged complaints with their mobile operators 
about poor network coverage, but lack of speedy redress forced them to 
switch. What the researcher picked up is that none of the respondents who 
indicated that their complaints were ignored by operators mentioned having 
escalated their complaints to the regulator for intervention.  The impression 
created by respondents is that consumers are oblivious about their rights and 
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opportunities for redress. This occurred despite the fact that during the 
interview, they indicated that they were provided with information about 
porting processes. That information should invariably provide for complaint 
procedures. 
The respondents indicated that operators, to a large extent, complied with a 
porting process time frame. About two respondents indicated that it took 
about two weeks, which was an inconvenience for them. None of them 
mentioned any charges for porting, especially post-paid subscribers. Basically 
the respondents were presumably not aware that they had been charged as 
MTN and Vodacom charge penalty charges. 
Awareness programmes by both the regulator and operators are not popular. 
Respondents said that they only saw adverts but nothing educational about 
MNP. Importantly, it was mentioned that training needs to be provided for the 
mobile shops and consultants.  
4.9. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the researcher summarises the key findings emanating from 
the three categories: the reasons for porting, the benefits of porting and the 
experiences during porting.   
With regard to reasons for porting, a high number of respondents indicated 
that operators’ network coverage was poor. The impact was felt more by 
contract subscribers who were expected to pay the monthly subscriptions fee 
despite the challenge of having a proper conversation without interruptions. In 
terms of benefits for porting respondents indicated that they were paying less 
money since porting.  
Low rates however could not be corroborated because they were unable to 
expantiate on how much exactly they benefited. In connection with 
experiences during porting respondents spoke more about times frames for 
porting. The majority of respondents were satisfied with the duration for 
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porting and only a few said that it took about a week to two weeks for porting 
to be completed which was an inconvenience on their side.  
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CHAPTER 5: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF MNP 
5. Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of the findings, focusing on the strengths 
and weaknesses of MNP. Furthermore, it consolidates common and varying 
perspectives on policy, regulation, mobile operators as well as subscribers 
responses. The analysis on policy focuses on competition growth and 
regulatory framework is informed by consumer protection expectations and 
monitoring of MNP regulations. The regulatory perspective is further looked at 
in line with other consumer regulations at ICASA. Fundamentally, this chapter 
draws on international best practice on MNP, as described in the literature 
review and the research findings. The analysis chapter will indicate whether 
MNP was successful in South Africa or not. 
5.1. Strengths of MNP in promoting competitive markets  
 
The introduction of MNP as stated in previous chapters was aimed at 
increasing competition in the market and leveling the playing field, for the 
benefit of consumers and new entrants. This was evident with Cell C’s 
performance at the beginning of MNP. Cell C was able to attract more 
customers who were originally with the dominant operators.  
 
Some of the operators viewed the convergence of former VANS licenses as 
another opportunity for competition growth, implying that these licensees 
would compete equally with mobile operators.  Increased competition was 
harnessed by the regulator’s acceptance of virtual mobile operators such as 
Virgin Mobile, to enter the market and compete on MNP. The MoU entered 
into cellular operators and their service providers such as Autopage 
contributed positively to a broader market in relation to MNP. Whilst positive 
steps were taken in ensuring that consumers had a vast choice regarding 
MNP, the researcher has not come across any indication that MNP in South 
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Africa drove prices down and enabled quality of service provision by all 
players in the market. Melody (2003) as mentioned previously, describes 
competition as the driver of low costs, quality of service and customer 
attraction which means any opposite actions by mobile operators on this 
definition would result in the failure of competition.  
5.1.1. Strategies implemented to increase competition 
There was willingness on the side of operators to prepare effectively for the 
introduction of MNP. Technology upgrade was performed on regular basis, in 
order to manage the level of drop calls, as well as ensuring availability of 
network coverage in all areas. Operators took advantage by investing in 
technology so as to attract new subscribers and retain old ones.  
The promulgation of End User and Service Charter regulations was viewed as 
a positive step in protecting consumers against poor service. These 
regulations provide parameters, measurements as well as targets which 
operators should adhere to in order to ensure quality of service. As pointed 
out by infodev (2006), the regulator has two fundamental objectives when 
developing standards and reporting mechanism for quality of service. First, it 
has to ensure that consumers are well served. Second, it has to require 
reports for compliance. Mobile operators in South Africa are in agreement 
with the End User Service Charter and international best practices on quality 
of service. “The percentage of connectivity failure rate must not exceed 3% of 
all connections including drop calls’. Moreover, operators were obliged to 
resolve complaints within 14 days” (Government Gazette no: 30553). 
South Africa performed fairly well in terms of technology adoption and the 
type of technology used for MNP processes was in line with international 
standards. A study by NERA has shown that for MNP to exist and be 
successful, technical feasibility should be a priority. Call forwarding facility has 
been adopted by many countries which introduced MNP and that includes 
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South Africa. Another study by Buehler et al (2006) indicated that technology 
was a contributory factor to the quality of MNP as it affects porting time 
frames and reliability.  
5.1.2. Choice 
MNP is viewed as victory for consumers, especially post-paid subscribers 
who were initially forced to stay with mobile operators, despite their 
discontentment with operator’s poor services, for fear of losing their numbers.  
This move has positive effects for both individuals and business alike. 
Business was faced with high costs of changing letter heads and 
inconveniencing their clients with new numbers and MNP provided a much 
needed relief.  
As mentioned in the literature review, studies by Geport et al (2001) and 
Buehler et al, (2005) indicated that customers valued their numbers, and the 
freedom to choose addressed mediocrity by network operators. In the past 
consumers who wanted to leave their service providers were discouraged to 
do so because they had to give up their numbers.  
Consumers are usually attracted by certain brands which they prefer to be 
associated with. In this scenario, quality of service or price does not matter. 
As indicated in the findings, the majority of subscribers were inclined to port 
for purposes of brand preference. This is a sentiment shared by 
Satitsamitpong & Mitomo (2008), which explored the influence of branding 
with regard to MNP and concluded that some of the consumers do not port 
because of low prices or quality of service, but switched in order to join their 
preferred brand. Ideally, choice is viewed as a regulatory strength and a 
success.  
5.1.3. Effective consumer awareness campaigns 
Consumer awareness programmes are essential for consumers to make 
informed decisions about MNP. Awareness on tariffs for on-net and off-net 
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calls are is important and so is information of porting processes and 
procedures is equally important. The fact that all operators provided 
information to consumers who wanted to port is encouraging. The campaigns 
and media advertisement on both television and radio had a positive impact 
on consumers. MNP regulation in this regard proves to be an effective tool for 
compliance. 
According to Baldwin & Cave (1999), competitive markets can only function 
properly when information is provided to consumers in order to make 
informed decisions.  It has been proven in the literature review that countries 
which implemented awareness programmes drew more interest on MNP than 
those with weak or no campaigns. South Korea had consumer awareness 
campaigns and marketing programmes which resulted in high demand for 
MNP. Most of the literature points to knowledge of tariff transparency and to 
awareness campaigns, especially for on-net and off-net calls. Not only should 
consumers be aware about warning tones (warning the consumer they are 
phoning a ported number), but they would also understand price 
differentiation. 
5.1.4. Value added services 
 
The evolution of telecommunications in respect to mobile services has 
resulted in the convergence of voice, data and video in the same platform. 
The majority of respondents indicated that internet access was a need and 
using a cellphone SIM card for voice and data was important. The 
respondents mentioned that they had ported from Cell C in particular to 
Vodacom and MTN because at the time, Cell C had no video and data 
options. Value added services became a competitive advantage for 
consumers in terms of choice. 
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The practice by consumers to port in order to access value added services is 
done globally. This was evident in Thailand where 3G was indicated as a 
reason for porting (Satitsamitpong & Mitomo, 2008).   
5.1.5. Experiences during porting 
Seemingly, South Africa is doing well with regard to compliance on porting 
times. Most subscribers indicated that they had not experienced any porting 
delays because it took only two days. Few subscribers said that it took two 
weeks for their ports processes to be completed. A contributory factor could 
be the regulatory requirement which stipulated that porting requests are to be 
facilitated by recipient operator.  
Both ICASA and operators developed a consumer guide which detailed 
porting processes including requirements for porting and reasons for 
disqualified ports. Based on the findings, it cannot be conclusively said that all 
port requests met the required standard but it could be lack of interest by 
consumers in lodging complaints.  In 2007, Tahalani Igbal provided an 
analysis of the failure of MNP. He said in countries like the UK, consumers 
complained about delaying tactics by donor operators. Unlike in South Africa 
where port requests were recipient-led, in the UK, porting request at the 
beginning was consumer-led.  
 
In the UK only one operator pushed for the introduction of MNP, and was 
supported by Oftel, the telecom regulator at the time. As a result, other 
operators imposed long porting times of about 25 days and even expected 
subscribers to obtain permission for moving from one network to another 
(Wieland, 2007). The porting process in The Netherlands took up to 5 weeks 
resulting in a failure of MNP in the country (Horrocks, 2007). The longer the 
time taken for porting, it is easier for donating operators to win back their 
customers through special promotions and personalised packages. 
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Another reason for low porting rates is because subscribers have no need to 
switch networks because of the ‘homogeneity’ of services on offer. The lack 
of competition in Ireland meant that subscribers did not perceive any benefits 
from a move from one operator to another, leading to low porting rates and 
economic failure of MNP. In Finland, operators imposed minimum contract 
periods which drove down porting rates from approximately 40 percent to 10 
percent (Horrocks, 2007). 
5.2. Weaknesses of MNP in promoting competitive markets 
 
5.1.1. Uncompetitive markets  
The Mobile sector in South Africa is regarded as uncompetitive because it 
has only three licensed mobile operators. Based on the literature review, 
competition in the telecommunications is more effective when there are more 
than three licensees.  Haucup (2003) indicates that the level of competition 
among operators should be a measure for the success of MNP. He cited 
countries like Ireland where MNP failed because there were only three mobile 
operators. Furthermore, South African mobile operators have acknowledged 
that they all provide similar products and price hence making it difficult for 
consumers to get competitive services.  
There is a disjuncture with the view that the success of MNP is determined on 
the oligopoly market, where market players are over four.  If the market size 
contributes to MNP, the question is why it failed in Sweden where there are 
16 mobile operators. A study by Guptal et al has shown that churn was 
preferred option by subscribers.  
Furthermore, convergence of former VANS licenses in South Africa has 
somehow increased competition. But competition remains limited to the 
provision of network access than service access because all former VANS 
are not competing on mobile services. It is mentioned in the findings chapter 
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that service providers and virtual mobile operators such as Virgin Mobile are 
able to action porting request. Unlike in Japan where competition resulted in 
low prices, MTN, Vodacom and Cell C indicated there was no price and 
product differentiation in respect to mobile services and therefore implying 
that MNP is a failure.  
There are subscribers who are not keen to port, instead preferring churn. 
There is a disjuncture again on how churn rate is viewed.  Other operators 
perceive it as a threat and others as an opportunity. Operators like MTN are 
in favour of churn instead of MNP, whilst Cell C views it as a negative 
because continuous change of SIM-cards, therefore contributing negatively to 
the operator’s subscriber base.  For instance, Sweden’s market was very 
competitive with 16 mobile operators but high number of subscribers 
preferred churn than MNP, presumably not giving value to their numbers. The 
preference of churn rate over MNP despite its benefits makes this option 
ambiguous. According to Gans, et al (2001), it is important to have a dynamic 
market and as many willing operators as possible. This will help regulators to 
work with a group of driven individuals ideally pushing for the facility.  
The DoC mentioned that MNP has failed because of lack of competition and 
price collusion by operators. Another dynamic on competition was mentioned 
by Horrocks (2007), who said that MNP should be introduced in countries with 
bigger markets.  This notion was shared by Ghana, which indicated in 2008 
that it would take precautionary measures before introducing MNP.  
In the UK, the study anticipated an economic boost through the 
implementation, however, delays contributed to low demand during the first 
year of MNP. The issue of churn rate was raised by MTN and Cell C as they 
are of the view that prepaid subscribers as the most significant category 
affecting churn in South Africa.  
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5.1.2. Poor quality service  
Until ICASA is strengthened to effectively enforce compliance of its consumer 
regulations, this vacuum will continue to create customer dissatisfaction. 
Whilst all mobile operators mentioned that they had continued to upgrade 
their technology on regular basis, in contrary, the problem of poor network 
seem to cut across because all respondents from all three mobile operators 
ported with the assumption that they will get improved services but to no 
avail.  As reported in the previous chapters, the effective regulator regulates 
in the public‘s interest by ensuring services at affordable prices. It develops 
regulations, monitors and enforces compliance.  
During the years under MNP review, starting from 2006-2008, the End User 
and Service charter regulation was not yet in place and only got implemented 
late in 2009. Seemingly, operators leveraged on this gap in order to not 
provide quality of service. The MNP regulations as well did not address 
issues of monitoring and enforcement, and this left consumers who ported at 
the mercy of operators because of the vacuum with regard to the regulatory 
mechanisms to address the provision of inferior services. 
The Authority has also implemented the regulations on the code of conduct 
three years after the implementation on MNP. These regulations address the 
behavior of operators when dealing with customers. This includes a 
turnaround time of 14 days to resolve complaints. However, these regulations 
were introduced three years after the implementation of MNP. As mentioned 
by ICASA, they have received complaints on porting, but had to negotiate 
with operators in order for them to resolve complaints. ICASA did not have a 
record on whether the complaints were finally resolved, which is indicative of 
regulatory failure in ensuring consumer protection.  
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The majority of subscribers said that they had ported because of persistent 
poor network coverage but surprisingly, the problem cuts across all mobile 
operators.  Another challenge with this finding is that poor network coverage 
leaves consumers susceptible to abuse by the industry, especially the post-
paid subscribers as they are expected to pay full subscription fee despite the 
fact that their calls are interrupted or cannot make calls as and when they 
wish where there is poor coverage. Whilst there is an attempt by ICASA to 
protect consumers against inferior services, the problem that remains is its 
lack of capacity to monitor and enforce compliance of its regulations.  
There is a disjuncture between what subscribers have experienced on quality 
of service and the responses by mobile operators on the strategies they put in 
place to ensure improved services. The response to this issue is indicative of 
fact that operators did not take quality of service seriously, despite the 
impression they gave in their responses about investment they make to 
ensure that their infrastructure is upgraded occasionally to ensure a seamless 
operations.  
5.1.3. High charges  
In 2010 former Minister of Communications General Siphiwe Nyanda made a 
pronouncement about the reduction of termination costs, subsequently, 
ICASA published the termination regulations. Whilst this move received a big 
coverage by media, a question which remains unanswered is how the 
consumer will benefit from implementation of these regulations and to date, 
there is no answer (DoC, 2010).  
There is a shortcoming to a certain extent in the way the ECA was crafted in 
comparison to the repealed Telecommunications Act. The latter gave powers 
to the authority to develop price regulations which addressed lack of price 
competition in the industry. The scenario currently is that the regulator does 
not have price regulations. An operator who wants to increase prices informs 
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the regulator through an application. That application is for information 
purposes, rather than decision making or intervention mechanism. Seemingly, 
the asymmetrical information on costs and prices still lie with the industry.  
The challenges with regard to the submission of six month COACAM reports 
could have also contributed to the authority lack of powers to manage tariff 
applications. In addition, delays by the authority’s to define significant market 
power could be a regulatory failure in ensuring that termination call rates are 
reduced. Whilst the authority had promulgated the regulations in 2010, there 
is no clarity on whether consumers will benefit.  
There is a possibility that ICASA will conduct a market study on termination 
rates in order to determine how much operators can apply to reduce call 
prices for end users. An analogy done by Boylaud and Nicolette in 2000 on 
telecommunications price and costs concluded that after the liberalization and 
privatisation of the market, there is strong empirical evidence that the impact 
of competition is negatively related to consumer prices.    
Satitsamitpong & Mitomo mentioned that in 2008, in countries such as 
Thailand, consumers were able to identify their discounts through billing 
statements. Furthermore, mobile operators in the US provided competitive 
prices which resulted in growth in competition.  To be more specific, for low 
plans, the prices fell at 4, 87%, and for medium and high plans at 6,9% (Park, 
2009). On the contrary, Vodacom and MTN’s view is that MNP did not bring 
about price cuts because of lack of competition in South Africa.  
ICASA’s view is that the inability by subscribers to understand their contracts 
and how they are billed does not mean that MNP failed to bring prices down. 
The DoC on the other hand said that MNP did not bring costs down due to 
collusion by operators. There is however a grey area in the MNP regulations. 
Section 6 (5) stipulates that “a donor operator shall not charge a subscriber 
when the subscriber ports their number and shall ensure that donor service 
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provider does not charge the subscriber when they port their number”. In an 
interview with Vodacom, it was clear that MTN charges ‘clawback’ for 
subscribers’ who wants to port. These charges as reported are not regulated. 
In order to protect consumers, the regulator has to review this clause and 
address it for the benefit of consumers but also to ensure consistency among 
operators. In 2004, Taaffe reported that operators in France even stipulated 
that customers who wanted to break their contracts had to provide up to three 
months’ notice before doing so. 
A scenario on cheaper prices was highlighted by Olla & Patel in 2006. Their 
perception is that market players introduced competitive prices in order to 
attract consumers to port, a view shared by Vodacom and MTN. On the 
contrary, a study by Ovum in 2005, highlighted in the literature review, 
indicated that that there is evidence that cheaper prices do not attract more 
porting among consumers. The study found that in most cases, there were 
challenges of long porting which discouraged consumers to switch. Another 
disjuncture with MNP was that, it could   not conclude that shorter porting 
times attracted more customers. The impression created is that, MNP as a 
competition option does not guarantee demand, and low prices were not 
necessarily a determining factor for porting. The question that remains, is how 
will South Africa ensure that MNP as a facility attract consumers, whilst the 
market ensuring competitive prices.  
As reported also by Ovum, Tahalani Igbal in 2007 indicated that MNP was not 
successful in several countries including Taiwan, Finland, UK and Malta.  The 
same view was shared by Katka in 2004 who suggested that high porting 
charges, long-winded applications, lengthy porting times, and handset 
subsidies have suppressed the change of networks on a large scale. The 
ambiguity of MNP as an option becomes complicated based on these 
findings. Could it be that MNP as a facility should be limited to keeping the 
number when one switches operators? Do these findings suggest that policy 
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makers and regulators should look at other competition option such as 
incentives for those who comply? The conclusion and recommendations 
chapter will address these. 
5.1.4. Poor consumer awareness on MNP 
Seemingly, operators and ICASA are not doing enough to educate 
consumers about mobile number portability. Whilst all subscribers mentioned 
that they had received information on MNP; many explained that the 
information was not sufficient and educative as it merely addressed porting 
processes. An impact study by Levin in 2006 outlined factors impacting on 
MNP and they included: marketing campaigns, contractual obligations and 
mobile phones subsidies. In his conclusion, he indicated that “The more 
aggressive the marketing campaign is, the more aware customers become of 
the possibility of MNP, and the higher the usage of this service will be” (Levin, 
2006).  
The MNP regulation (Government Gazette, 28091) stipulated that operators 
and the regulator were duty bound to educate the public about MNP.  During 
the interview, it became clear subscribers were ignorant about many 
attributes of MNP other than the processes. None of the respondents could 
elaborate when asked about the call charges they were paying with their new 
operator in comparison with the old one. They did not know charges of off 
and on peak after porting, nor were they aware about charges for on- net or 
off-net after porting.  
All operators mentioned that they had information published in their websites, 
and moreover, had pamphlets available at their centers. Whilst operators 
indicated that information was available, it appears that those who could only 
access it are the ones in cosmopolitan areas where every town has internet 
café and many have access in their homes, either through Asymmetric Digital 
Subscriber Line (ADSL) technology or 3G.  
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The importance of consumer awareness with regard to MNP is captured in 
the literature review section. Scholars described how consumer ignorance 
leads to MNP complexities. A scenario which was not applicable prior to MNP 
because consumers were aware through the prefix number identification the 
network they were calling and it was easy to understand price differentiation. 
A study conducted by Shin, in 2007 found that consumers were paying 
indirect costs because of ignorance to distinguish between networks when 
placing calls and operators were not transparent about call rate information. 
Contrary to the study by Shin, Small in 2005 made an analysis on switching 
costs and found that costs were reduced and MNP improved the welfare of 
consumers. Podvisostskiy in 2006 indicated that switching costs impacted 
negatively on consumers. They conclude that porting costs by operators, 
customers ignorance on issues related to porting, welfare of benefits for 
consumers become ambiguous.  
During the interview with ICASA Councilor, she indicated that it remains the 
operator’s prerogative to charge any amount they deem it fit for switching as 
the authority was not responsible for tariffs, but acknowledged that lack of 
transparency could lead to exorbitant charges which may discourage 
consumers to port.  
Notably, section 7 (4) of the MNP regulations address issues of service and 
requirements and states that: “to ensure tariff transparency for callers, where 
as a result of number portability the termination rate charge for a call to a 
ported number is more than 10% higher than the termination rate charged by 
the operator allocated the number block, that contains the ported number, the 
operator shall apply a warning to be agreed with the authority before 
connecting the call and shall not charge for the period during which the 
warning is applied”.  
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Whilst the authority has agreed with operators on this requirement, the short-
coming is that consumers, even though the beep occurs, don’t know the 
difference in terms of charges. To a certain extent, awareness on the purpose 
of the beep is non-existent.  In 1999, Baldwin and Cave indicated that when 
information is made easily accessible, it could capacitate consumers to make 
sound decisions on product and service choice.  These were the same 
findings which emanated from the study in Australia whereby it was found 
that problems of porting were exacerbated by lack of quality of service and 
lack of information.  A study conducted by Lee et al (2004) in South Korea, 
indicated that there was willingness by subscribers to pay monthly bill and this 
was associated with income, awareness on MNP and the intention to switch.  
5.1.5. Unregulated bundled services  
The Authority drafted the draft regulations on handsets subsidy. The former 
chairman of ICASA Paris Mashile said the regulator was forced to look into 
matters as a result of huge mountain of concerns raised by consumers.  “The 
key issues are lack of transparency of details in the contract vis-a-vis handset 
subsidy and the service provided as well as the issue of unused minutes 
which have been paid for...They [operators] should communicate in a 
language best understood by consumers" (Government Gazette, 32083).  
The irony with bundled services is the inability of ICASA to exercise its 
powers to stop industry from forcing bundled services on consumers, hence 
compromising the rights of consumers in respect of choice. In 2007, Iqbal 
wrote that the regulator should be able to wield significant authority over the 
sector and be committed to driving the facility in order to ensure that MNP is 
successful. Seemingly, ICASA is unable to exert pressure in ensuring that 
MNP is success. ICASA indicated that the industry was not cooperative with 
regard to the draft regulations on handsets subsidy and seemingly, the 
regulator was about to give up in ensuring its finalisation. In 2004,Smura 
reported that , when MNP in Finland was failing, regulators stepped in to 
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ensure that operators did not provide handset subsidies and long-term 
contracts. 
Operators submitted that the draft regulations were “ultra vires” the ECA, and 
threatened ICASA with litigation should it proceed with the implementation. 
Basically, they indicated that ICASA was interfering with commercial business 
as handsets were not a regulatory issue. Also, they mentioned that the 
content of the draft regulation was a duplication of what is contained in the 
Consumer Protection Act no 68 of 2008. It cannot be said that consumers 
have benefited by merely getting a new package without understanding the 
costs model of handsets subsidy. The decision by ICASA to abandon these 
draft regulations since 2004 did not provide any solution. 
The voice of mobile operators in this regard seems to be stronger and more 
powerful than that of the regulator and consumers. ICASA should be working 
towards influencing policy with regard to bundled services, and doing 
benchmarks with countries such as Finland and others which have 
succeeded in developing regulations. 
The anomaly with regard to the bundles is the voice of consumers. The 
question is whether they prefer bundled services or not as no study has been 
made to conclude this. Most subscribers indicated that they wouldn’t have 
normally ported had it been not for the phone packages they required. There 
are various types of packages but in this context, the study refers to 
handsets. If a subscriber had identified a handset which his or her operator 
could not provide, then he or she would decide to make a port request. Most 
subscribers indicated that after porting, they wanted to return to their 
operators, and that could not be done until a period of three months expires. 
In most cases, it was difficult to switch back within a short space of time 
especially for contract subscribers as they had to pay off their contract.  
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Prices of mobile services are also affected by bundled services, especially for 
post-paid subscribers. When they sign their contract, they receive a 24 
months contract with a hand set. The problem with bundled services is lack of 
transparency for consumers in understanding what they are exactly paying 
for. Furthermore, there is potential for consumers to encounter poor service or 
pay more with other operators instead of purchasing a handset separately 
from a service. 
5.1.6. Limited understanding and description of choice 
The researcher has realised that choice as described by all respondents is 
looked at selectively, whereby consumer moves from one operator to the 
other. Nothing was said in connection with a right to choose a product such 
as acquiring a handset anywhere without having to change operators as it 
was discussed with the handset subsidy. This is a gap which the regulator 
should address in order to protect the rights of consumers.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ON MNP AND COMPETITION   
6. Introduction  
This chapter sums up the discussions in the previous chapter. Furthermore, it 
provides a summary of the evolution of processes which led to the 
introduction of competition in the telecommunications sector.  The purpose of 
this study was to investigate the extent to which MNP has made an impact on 
consumers of South Africa. In order to examine the effects, first, policy 
perspectives were sought from the Department of Communications including 
the regulator and operators. Second there was a need to have a regulatory 
perspective with leading responses from ICASA, DoC and operators, third, 
from four operators as well as 30 subscribers. The analysis was based on the 
strength and weaknesses of MNP with regard to competition. The themes that 
are analysed are competition growth, consumer choice, quality of service and 
lower costs. MNP is just but one of other components of competition. 
6.1. Summary of arguments and findings in relation to the literature 
review 
6.1.1. Policy in relation to competition in the telecommunication sector  
The convergence of the telecommunications services has to a certain extent 
levelled the playing field.  The convergence of former VANS licenses and the 
option of licensees to apply for electronic communication services and 
electronic communications network services licenses has open the market for 
more competition. The introduction of MNP is viewed as another enabler of 
competition. The regulatory strength in the converged environment is the 
power to license Electronic Communications Network Services licenses on 
Electronic Communications Services and vice – versa.  
 This could increase competition even further as it happened now with Telkom 
venturing into mobile services, as well as Multichoice acquiring a license on 
mobile TV services. 
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6.1.2. Regulatory power to facilitate for competition 
 
The regulatory environment requires strengthening in order to ensure fair 
competition and consumer protection. Currently, ICASA is not capacitated to 
enforce and monitor compliance of regulations. There are gaps in respect to 
the MNP regulations as they lack monitoring and penalty clauses, therefore 
resulting in a weak regulator. One of the main attributes of MNP is freedom to 
choose whilst keeping one’s phone number. The regulator should issue lock-
in strategies by operators as MNP is not a favour but a regulatory obligation. 
Furthermore, penalty clauses incurred by consumers who want to port must 
be addressed, and based on a feedback from operators; the regulator has 
done nothing to address this problem. 
It is a general observation that consumers don’t know what they are paying 
for. There are several price competition issues affecting MNP: the issue of 
bundled services is still an issue especially for contract payers. Since 2004, 
the regulator held consultation processes on handsets subsidies but for over 
5 years there has not been closure on the matter. The regulator should take a 
decision on handset subsidy regulations and may have to contact policy 
makers for a policy directive on bundled services.  
Another issue impacting on pricing is interconnection rates. In 2010 the 
regulator published termination rate regulations. The challenge with these 
regulations is that the benefits of rate reduction are experienced by operators 
and not consumers. The regulator should conduct a market study and 
determine price cap for consumers.  
Lack of price transparency is another challenge which is faced by consumers, 
especially on on-net and off-net calls, peak and off-pick calls. The regulator 
should enforce compliance and this could be done with the revision of 
penalties clauses as it is done by Competition Commission.  
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There was a general consensus among subscribers that both operators and 
ICASA were not providing awareness campaigns. Whilst operators 
maintained that information was available on their websites, there is an 
impression created by consumers that call centres were ignorant about MNP 
and failed to provide clarity when asked. The authority on the other hand 
mentioned that they conducted aggressive campaigns during the launch in 
2006 but soon abandoned the programmes as they were expensive and also 
that operators did not want to take part required in the regulations. Consumer 
awareness programmes are vitally important for consumers to make informed 
decision on MNP but also on prices and products. Poor awareness 
programmes and marketing campaigns are indicative of the fact that 
operators are reluctant to continuously implement MNP.  
South Africa had low ported numbers. According to the database from 
Number Portability Company, from 2006 to 2008, about half a million 
numbers were ported despite the 50 million subscriber’s base claimed by 
operators. Based on the literature review, the success of MNP is measured 
on the number of ports. The number of mobile players with competitive prices 
and product differentiation are yard sticks for effective MNP implementation. 
The power of the independent regulator to ensure that issues of competition 
are taken seriously by mobile operators is important. 
6.1.3. Competition strategies implemented by mobile operators  
The impression created is that porting takes place as a matter of regulatory 
compliance than on the basis of competition. Technical efficiency is the 
determining factor of quality of service and measurements are important to 
ensure that operators comply. In 2009, the authority published regulations on 
End User Service charter. These regulations address issues of network 
coverage, drop calls and customer care turnaround times. The positive side 
with regard to the regulations is that they are available and are used as a 
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yard stick for compliance, despite the fact that came three years later after 
MNP was introduced.  
The negative side on these regulations is that the regulator cannot use them 
in certain instances where operators claim ‘force majeure’ on a high number 
of drop calls or poor network coverage. Force majeure is described as forces 
of nature which cause interference in the services. The penalty clauses 
placed in the regulations becomes null and void if the authority does not 
ensure proper technical skills and capacity to investigate causes of drop calls.  
The fact that the majority of respondents highlighted quality of service, mainly 
poor network coverage as the reason for porting, seems to indicate that 
operator services are poor, and because of lack of competition, the problem 
of poor network coverage  cuts across all mobile operators.  
The findings indicate that whilst consumers have a right to choice, it is marred 
by delaying tactics and penalty charges which are not transparent. The 
authority should not allow for anomalies in the way customers are treated. 
Consistency should apply in terms of application of penalty clauses to 
operators and this should be regulated.  
In conclusion, the fundamental action which should be taken by ICASA in 
ensuring that MNP is a success is to ensure that proper measurable systems 
are in place. The success of MNP should not be ambiguous but the best way 
to demystify it is through regulations. As much as the regulator has come up 
with regulations on what constitutes quality of service, the same should apply 
to the reduction of prices. This could be linked to call rates for on-net or off-
net calls, peak or off-peak calls, unbundling of services including handsets. 
ICASA should ensure that compliance is adhered to by operators and failure 
to do so should be met with penalties which will make ICASA gain respect in 
the industry and in the eyes of consumers. 
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6.2. Recommendations on MNP and competition  
Advice on the need for policy amendment 
The ECA No 36 of 2005 should be amended in order to address competition 
issues effectively. Pricing issues should be prioritised as it happened during 
the repealed Telecommunications Act of 1996. If the market is unable to 
compete on pricing then policy should call for price regulations. Until 
operators are forced by policy to lower prices, MNP will never benefit 
consumers.  
Advice on the strengthening of regulation 
A weak regulator will continue to expose consumers to industry abuse 
because of poor crafted regulations, lack of monitoring and enforcement. 
ICASA requires proper funding in order to employ specialist in the field of 
communications. There should be skills development and secondment of staff 
to under study countries where consumer regulations are successful. The 
MNP regulations and the End User and Service Charter regulations should be 
reviewed as a matter of urgency.  Gillwald describes attributes of the 
regulator as follows: 
The effectiveness of a politically non- complaint regulator can be undermined 
by simply not providing them with adequate resources to attract skilled staff 
and councilors through competitive remuneration packages, utilising the best 
consultants, even having resources to fulfill the public administrative 
procedures  and defending decisions in courts (2006, 13 quoted by 
SR.Hlongwane, 2009, p. 107). 
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Advice for mobile operators on MNP and competition strategies 
Operators should take the needs of consumers seriously by ensuring that 
provision of lower prices and quality of services should be self-regulated.  As 
it happened in other countries with MNP, consumers preferred churn than 
MNP because operators provided competitive prices and products, as well as 
quality of service. The choice should be left to consumers but options of 
competition should be plenty. With the new Consumer Protection Act of 2008, 
the regulator and the National Consumer Commission should sign MoU for 
collaboration and cooperation on issues pertaining to consumer complaints.  
Advice for subscribers on the right to information 
There is a tendency and reluctance by consumers not to read their contract 
terms and conditions. This challenge should be demystified and consumers 
should be activist in the field of knowledge when spending their money.  It 
was clear during the interviews that consumers are ignorant of what they are 
paying for. They are not inclined on seeking information hence leaving mobile 
operators to leverage on that ignorance when setting up prices.  
Finally, research and innovation should be taken seriously by the 
telecommunication industry in order to improve strategies with regard to 
competition.  MNP should be viewed as a permanent feature of competition 
which should not change but remain for those who want to utilise it when they 
need to. Many consumers, both individual and business value their numbers 
and that should not change. Moreover, quality of service is another dimension 
of customer satisfaction. 
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8. APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Approval Letter from Number Portability Company to acquire  
                    database of ported numbers 
 
APPENDIX 3: SUBSCRIBER QUESTIONNAIRE 
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QUESTINNAIRE: THE IMPACT OF MOBILE NUMBER PORTABILITY TO 
CONSUMERS OF SOUTH AFRICA 
My name is Thenjiwe Dube. I am a Masters student at the University of Witwatersrand, conducting research on 
‘the impact of MNP’. As a mobile subscriber who has ported your number, I would like to ask you some questions. 
This is a confidential survey and no personal details will be released. Your answers will remain confidential. 
SECTION A: INTERVIEWEE’S PROFILE 
                              Details to be inserted before the interview 
Cell phone number (Interviewer to 
record the number) 
 
Year ported (Interviewer to record the 
number) 
 
 
Questions 
1. Are you a contract or prepaid customer 
Contract  
Prepaid  
2. Which Cell phone company did you port? (Your original service provider) 
MTN  
Vodacom  
Cell C  
3. Which cellphone company did you port to? (Your current service provider) 
MTN  
Vodacom  
Cell C  
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SECTION B: REASONS FOR PORTING 
1. What were the main reasons for porting 
2. Was it easy to understand the information on Mobile Number Portability? 
3. Do you think that mobile operators are doing enough to advertise MNP? 
4. Has ICASA and mobile operators did enough to educate consumers on MNP? 
SECTION C: BENEFITS OF MNP 
1. Since you ported your number, please explain the benefits you have experienced? 
2. Have you experienced any changes with regard to call charges? Please explain 
3. Can you describe any changes with regard to call charges? Please explain? 
SECTION D: EXPERIENCES REGARDING PORTING 
1. How long (days or hours) did it take you to port? 
2. Were you charged any fee for porting? 
3. How did you feel about the amount you paid? 
4. Were you aware that you will pay the amount at the time ported? 
5. What do you think should be done to improve porting? 
 
 
